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Introduction
The three chapters presented in the following apply the concept of general equilibrium to topics
related to labor markets.
The first chapter "Decentralization of wage bargaining" focuses on the changes in collective
bargaining institutions that a number of European countries have witnessed in the last decades,
with a tendency towards more decentralized wage negotiations, especially in the Scandinavian
countries. In particular, this first chapter analyzes the reason why centralized systems of wage
bargaining that have performed very well in terms of macroeconomic variables, collapse. We
construct a general equilibrium model with matching in the labor market and include a federation
of unions, which are coalitions of heterogeneous workers, whose role is to bargain wages for the
workers with the firms taking into account redistributive issues, so as to create a framework able
to replicate the Scandinavian labor markets for the seventies. We show that the collapse of this
system is a consequence of a skill-biased technical change that increases the differences across
workers making this kind of coalition unsustainable.
The second chapter "An estimated DSGE-matching model for the US economy" estimates
via maximum likelihood a DSGE model using US data. The theoretical model is an extended
version of the RBC Andolfatto (1996) model of frictional labor markets, in which beyond the
standard neutral technology shock we have introduced a preference shock in the utility function,
an investment-specific technology shock and a job-separation shock. Once estimated, we perform
a variance decomposition analysis to identify which shocks are driving the cyclical fluctuations of
the main variables of the model. The results show that the neutral and the investment-specific
technology shocks explain most of the fluctuations of the variables of the model; and that the
shock to job destruction is successful in explaining the variance of tightness.
The third chapter "A RBCmodel with unemployed loss of skills" proposes a model of frictional
labor markets with two types of workers: high-skilled and low-skilled workers, where high-skilled
vii
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workers may suffer from a depreciation of their human capital while unemployed. We estimate
the parameters of the model via maximum likelihood and analyze the its cyclical properties. We
also contribute to the literature that tries to explain the different performance of European and
US unemployment reconciling the macro and micro evidence.
Chapter 1
Decentralization of wage bargaining
1
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1.1 Introduction
Wage bargaining can take place at different levels. At one extreme we find decentralized wage
bargaining systems in which workers and employers negotiate over wages and working conditions
at the firm level while at the other extreme, national unions and employers’ associations bargain
for the whole country in what is called centralized wage bargaining. An intermediate case is the
sectoral, branch or industry-level.
During the 1980s, there was a growing interest in explaining the macroeconomic consequences
of different wage-bargaining systems. Highly centralized systems of wage bargaining lead to low
unemployment and inflation rates and, in general, to a good economic performance. The well
known Calmfors and Driffill (1988) "bell-shaped" curve summarizes very well the conclusion of
this research: highly centralized and highly decentralized systems of wage bargaining outperform
intermediate ones in terms of macroeconomic variables.
The explanation this literature gives for the macroeconomic success of economies like the
Nordic ones or Austria with centralized levels of wage bargaining relies on the cooperative be-
havior of the negotiations. Centralized systems have the advantage of encompassing all workers
and firms in the economy and this allows them to take different macroeconomic considerations
into account, in particular, they can internalize bargaining externalities (for a complete survey
Calmfors (1993)). In general, real wage increases for a certain group of workers have negative
externalities on other groups of agents in the economy. The cooperative behavior means that
the effects on others of claims of higher wages are considered and the incentives for real wage
restraints are strengthened.
But last decades have witnessed substantial changes in the patter of unionization and wage
bargaining in the OECD countries. According to the 1997 OECD’s Employment Outlook, "recent
years have seen quite substantial changes in some countries’ collective bargaining institutions".
And although the pattern has not been uniform across all OECD countries, during the 1980s the
main level of interaction in industrial relations shifted from national to industrial level and from
industries to individual firms. In most continental Europe several indeces of coordination and
centralization in bargaining institutions show a trend towards more decentralized wage negotia-
tions, especially in the Scandinavian countries, where the level of centralization was indeed the
highest.
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It is therefore, very surprising, that bargaining systems that are superior to others in terms of
macroeconomic performance collapse. In this paper we analyze the determinants of the collapse
of those centralized bargaining systems.
Recently, new hypothesis for deunionization and decentralization in union’s wage setting based
on skill biased technical change have been advanced by Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) and
Ortigueira (2004). Their arguments rely on the view that unions are coalitions of heterogeneous
workers which extract rents form employers and only exist as far as members have an incentive
to stay in the coalition and continue bargaining in a centralized fashion. The hypothesis these
authors present is that a skill-biased technical change can dramatically alter such incentives1.
Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) explain the shift from centralization towards decen-
tralization in the wage setting through the impact that this skill-bias has on wage compression
in the sense that "skill-biased technical change increases the outside option of skilled workers,
undermining the coalition among skilled and unskilled workers in support of unions"
We construct a general equilibrium model with matching in the labor market and heteroge-
neous workers. In our benchmark model there is a federation of unions whose role is to bargain
worker’s wages with firms taking into account redistributive issues. The fact that the federation of
unions encompasses all workers allows it to take any macroeconomic consideration into account2.
In this paper we assume that a centralized union can internalize the search externality generated
in the labor market, in contrast to other papers that have modellized Nordic labor markets before
see e.g. Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Ortigueira (2004). To internalize this externality means
that we assume that unions can potentially generate an efficient-enhancing role in the economy.
We introduce skill biased technical change shock into the economy and analyze its consecuences
for bargaining and for welfare. To do this exercise we examine three different scenarios: (1) one
scenario with decentralized levels of wage bargaining in which there are no unions and individual
workers barging their wages directly with the firm, (2) another scenario with intermediate levels
1For a survey of the impact of technical change on labor market see Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005)
2Calmfors and Drifill (1988) are able to identify different externalities that can be internalized when negoti-
ating wages in a centralized way. The most common ones are the effects that wage increases in one part of the
economy generate on price rises of intermediate or final products and the effects that wage increases have on the
unemployment rate, and consequently the tax burden to maintain the welfare system.
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of wage bargaining in which the wages of homogeneous workers are bargained by a union or
institution that takes into account the congestion that an additional worker creates over other
workers of the same type but not over the whole working labor force and (3) the already mentioned
economy with centralized levels of wage barging with a federation of unions that encompass all
types of workers and bargain their wages taking into account the congestion generated in the
market and redistributive issues.
The main result of the paper is that after a skill biased technical change (or SBTC) has
affected the economy, there are other systems for negotiating wages different from the centralized
one, that result more appealing for certain types of workers, in particular for those who benefit
more from the technical change. Thus, this simple model help us to understand why centralized
systems of wage bargaining collapse in spite of their excellent economic performance.
The structure of the paper is the following: in section 2, we present and justify the main
assumptions of our model. In section 3 we present the model and define the equilibria under
three different scenarios depending on the level of coordination in the wage setting process:
decentralized, intermediate and centralized. In section 4 we will calibrate the model and in
section 5 present our results, and we conclude in section 6.
1.2 Main assumptions
Our paper is based on Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001). We adopt the main assumptions
of their model and we embed them into the search matching framework. Those assumptions are
that (1) Unions exist and they provide some benefits either to the society or to some group of
workers, (2) wage compression across workers with different skills is a characteristic of unions and
(3) there is a skill-biased technical change.
The assumption that unions provide some benefits to the society can be justified in economies
with high levels of unionization and centralization. There are two main streams in the literature
of trade unions. The traditional one, focus on the view of unions as rent-seeking institutions, i.e.,
as organizations that coordinate workers in order to extract rents from the employers. In this
framework, unions control the labor supply and end up distorting relative prices and reducing
employment (see eg. McDonald and Solow (1981), Johnson (1990), Farber (1986)). From this
perspective, unions generate a bad economic performance and cause efficiency losses. The second
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stream of the literature on trade unions starts from the work of Hirschman (1970) who questioned
whether unions are a source of inefficiency given their presence in so many countries and the em-
pirical evidence suggesting that high levels of unionization lead to a lower rates of unemployment.
These caveats lead to another approach in which unions are seen as efficiency-enhacing entities,
which arise as a response to a particular form of market imperfection or an inadequate insurance
against labor risks.
Freeman and Medoff (1984) provide empirical support to the fact that on net, unions are
beneficial for the society because although it is true that they exert some monopoly power,
this negative aspect can be outweighed by the beneficial effects they have on efficiency such as
income distribution, social organization, reduction of labor turnover, etc. Other authors justify
the existence of unions as a response to an inadequate insurance against labor risks, see e.g.
Malcomson (1983), Agell (2000) and Hogan (2001). In a sense, the union is seen as a substitute
for legal contractual enforcement and can be used to promote more efficient levels of employment
when legal contractual enforcement is unavailable. Checchi and Lucifora (2002) view unions as
economic agents that supply private and collective services to their members and perform useful
roles, not fulfilled by markets or government institutions. These services are substitutes for state’s
provision or certain labor market institutions.
In our set-up, we introduce a potential for efficiency gains from unions by assuming that they
can internalize the search externalities.
In models of search and matching, firms post vacancies and unemployed workers search for
jobs, and the outcome of a match between a vacancy and a searcher is a productive job. Firms
and workers behave uncoordinatedly, dedicating time and effort to the search of a partner. The
probability that a firm or an unemployed worker find a partner depends on the relative number
of vacancies and searchers. For example, an increase in the number of vacancies relative to the
number of searchers increases the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job but reduces,
at the same time, the probability that a vacancy get filled. This example shows that there is an
externality in the market. Due to the fact that this externality is generated by the search activity,
it is normally called a search externality3.
Secondly, we introduce intra-union redistribution which leads to less wage inequality the more
centralized is the bargaining in the economy (see eg. Freeman (1988) and Rowthorn (1992)). In
3Definition extracted from Bagliano and Bertola (2004)
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general, collective bargaining agreements limit the ability of the firm to remunerate individual
workers differently and, therefore, this form of setting wages called union "rate standardization
policy" reduce wage dispersion considerably.
Furthermore, very centralized systems like the Scandinavian ones are clear examples of how
high degree of centralization and low wage dispersion go hand in hand. Especially in Sweden
where egalitarian wage policies were explicitly adopted by the central union confederation (see
eg. Flanagan, Soskice and Ulman (1983), Flanagan (1987) or Siven (1987)). This tendency of
reducing wage dispersion existed until the early eighties when wage negotiations became more
decentralized
Although no fully-fledged theory about the impact of centralization on wage differentials has
been built, several arguments have explained this wage compression. Among the most relevant
we find Freeman (1980) and Agell and Lommerud (1992). The former explanation focuses on the
political economy theory and suggests that if the union wage policy is decided by the median
member, when there are differences in productivity across members and most of them are at
the bottom of the distribution, one should expect a compression of wage differentials; whereas
the latter explanation relies on the rawlsian "ignorance veil" to explain that if workers are risk
averse and do not know their future level of skill, then they are willing to trade some low skill
unemployment against reduced wage differentials. Nevertheless, as Calmfors (1993) points out,
the most common argument why higher degree of centralization should reduce wage dispersion is
that the distribution of wages enters the utility function of unions and members.
Finally, skill-biased technical change is defined by a change in productivity that is biased by
favouring workers with higher levels of education and skills over those with lower levels. This bias
occurs because the introduction of a new technology will increase the demand for workers whose
skills and knowledge complement that technology. It is generally accepted that OECD countries
have suffered this type of shock.
1.3 The model
In this section we present a simple model of frictional unemployment and define the equilibrium
under different levels of centralization in the wage bargaining process Unions are coalitions of
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workers whose main role is to negotiate wages with firms taking into account the congesting effect
that an additional searcher generates over the set of searchers already existing.
1.3.1 Description of the model
Workers and preferences
Workers are heterogeneous, in particular we assume that they differ in skills. We assume that
there are two skill groups: skilled (s) and unskilled (u). The measure of type-j workers is denoted
by xj, for j = s, u and the total measure of workers is normalized to one (xu + xs = 1). Workers
are risk neutral. We assume the existence of two representative households of size xs and xu each.
A household j, for j = s, u solves the following problem,
Max
∞∑
t=0
βtcj,t (1.1)
where β lies between zero and one and consumption, cj,t equals the total wage bill wj,tnj,t.
Employment, nj,t is a predetermined variable whose law of motion is given by
nj,t+1 = nj,t − λjnj,t +mj,tuj,t (1.2)
where uj,t denotes the measure of type-j searchers, λj > 0 is the rate of job destruction and mj,t
is the perceived probability that an unemployed worker of type j be matched in period t. This
probability is defined as the total number of matches of type j over the set of searchers of the
same type:
mj,t =
Mj,t
uj,t
(1.3)
Capitalists
The owners of capital and firms are called capitalists. We assume that they are risk neutral and
their only decision is to split current income between consumption, ct, and investment, it. Their
objective is to maximize the discounted lifetime consumption of the aggregate good. Capitalists’
income is made up of capital income and firm’s profits. Thus, capitalists’ consumption at time t,
is determined by the budget constraint,
ct + it = rtkt + πt (1.4)
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where it denotes, more specifically gross investment and πt denotes firms’ profits. Capital depre-
ciates at rate δ, and the law of motion for capital is:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it (1.5)
Hence, it is straightforward to show that the optimal investment policy for the capitalists calls
for the standard:
1 + rt − δ =
1
β
(1.6)
where rt denotes the rental price of capital.
Firms
The production sector is made up of a large number of identical competitive firms. There is
a representative firm which uses capital and the two types of labor to produce the aggregate
good. The production technology is represented by F (kt, nst, nut), where F is strictly jointly
concave, twice continuously differentiable and increasing. Further assumptions on the elasticity
of substitution between the two types of labor will be imposed below.
Since the labor market is frictional, the law of motion of the firm’s stock of employment is
given by
nj,t+1 = nj,t − λjnj,t + µj,tvj,t (1.7)
where µj,t is the perceived probability that a vacancy of type-j be matched with an unemployed
worker of the same type and λj is the exogenous destruction rate for type-j workers
The firm hires capital and open vacancies to maximize the present value of cash flows,
∞∑
t=0
1∏
τ=0
Rτ
F (kt, nst, nut)− rtkt − ∑
j=s,u
w
j ,tnj,t −
∑
j=s,u
aj,tvj,t
 (1.8)
subject to equation (7). Rτ = 1 + rτ − δ is the gross rate of return, and aj,tvj,t denotes the cost
of opening vj,t vacancies of type-j.
The firm’s demand for capital obeys the standard optimality condition,
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Fk = rt (1.9)
where Fk denotes the marginal productivity of capital and rt denotes the rental price of capital.
The condition that determines the optimal number of vacancies of type-j at period t is given by
µj,tJj,t = aj,t (1.10)
where Jj,t is the income value of type-j employment to the firm. This latter value satisfies the
following arbitrage condition
(rt+1 − δ)Jj,t = Jj,t+1 − Jj,t − λjJj,t+1 + (Fnj,t+1 −wj,t+1) (1.11)
where Fnj denotes the marginal productivity of type-j labor. This arbitrage equation estab-
lishes that the capital cost of the job, (rt+1 − δ)Jj,t, must equal the job’s net profit flow,
Fnj,t+1(kt, nst, nut)−wj,t+1, plus capital gains, Jt+1− Jt, net of the risk of losing the job, λjJt+1.
Matching
The total number of matches for a type of worker j taking place per unit of time is given by the
matching function:
Mj,t = m(uj,t,vj,t) (1.12)
where uj,t represents the total number of type-j searchers and vj,t the total number of vacancies
of type-j.
We assume that the matching function is increasing in both arguments, concave and homoge-
neous of degree one, and that the total number of type-j matches satisfy the following condition
Mj,t < min(uj,t,vj,t)
which means that it cannot be greater than the number of type-j searchers in the economy or
the number of type-j vacancies posted by firms.
1.3.2 The equilibrium
We analyze three types of equilibria: equilibrium in an economy with decentralized levels of
wage bargaining, equilibrium in an economy with intermediate levels of wage bargaining and
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equilibrium in an economy with centralized levels of wage bargaining. The difference across them
relies on the existence or not of collective bargaining and the redistribution or not among types
of workers.
Collective bargaining is a process of decision making between parties representing the em-
ployer’s and the employee’s interests. Depending on whether the union, which by assumption
internalizes the search externality, represents the interests of one type of worker or instead en-
compasses both types, we will be under the intermediate or the centralized case, respectively.
The decentralized equilibrium implies that workers bargain over wages directly with the firms.
Decentralized equilibrium: the economy without unions
In the economy without unions, when a worker decides to engage in looking for a job, he does not
take into consideration the effects that his search exerts on the probability of other searches of
being matched. This means that workers of type j take the probability of finding a job or arrival
rate to a job, mj,t, parametrically. Therefore, under this equilibrium, individual workers do not
take into account that their own search congest the market and prejudice other workers.
We follow the standard literature on frictional unemployment and assume that wages are the
solution to Nash-bargaining. The Nash solution maximizes the weighted product of the worker’s
and the firm’s income values of employment. Hence, if we use p to denote the worker’s bargaining
power, the wage rate is,
wj,t = argmax
{
W pj,tJ
(1−p)
j,t
}
(1.13)
The first order condition to this maximization problem is
Wj,t = p(Wj,t + Jj,t) (1.14)
which states that the worker will get a share p of the total income generated by the match.
The value of employment for the household j, Wj,t solves the following arbitrage condition
(rt+1 − δ)Wj,t +mj,t+1Wj,t+1 = wj,t+1 +Wj,t+1 −Wj,t − λjWj,t+1 (1.15)
This arbitrage equation establishes that the capital cost of a job,(rt+1 − δ)Wj,t , plus the
opportunity cost ,mj,t+1Wj,t+1, must equal the yield of holding the job, which is made up of the
wage rate, wj,t+1 plus capital gains, Wj,t+1 −Wj,t net of the risk of losing the job, λjWj,t+1.
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The income value of type-j employment for a firm is given by equation (1.11). Therefore, the
optimal wage rate at time t is given by:
wj = pFnj + paj
vj
uj
for j = s, u (1.16)
which means that workers are rewarded for their contribution to output and for the saving of
hiring costs that the representative firm enjoys when a job of type-j is formed.
We can define the equilibrium for this economy, the decentralized bargaining equilibrium, as a
set of infinite sequences for the rental price of equipment {rt}, wage rates {wut, wst}, employment
levels {nut, nst}, capital {kt}, vacancies {vu,t, vs,t}, arrival rate {mu,t,ms,t} and matching rates
{µut, µst} such that,
(i) Taking the rental prices and matching rates as given, {kt} and {vu,t, vs,t} maximize the
firms’ profits.
(ii) Taking the rental price of equipment as given, {kt} maximizes capitalists’ lifetime utility.
(iii) Wages are the Nash solution to uncoordinated bargaining problems.
(iv) Taking wages and matching rates, {njt} and {cjt} solve the workers’ optimization prob-
lem.
(v) Matching rates and arrival rates are given by the matching function.
Intermediate equilibrium: the economy with unions
Here we assume the existence of two unions, one for each collar line. Thus, each union is formed by
homogeneous workers. The assumption that unions internalize the search externality generated
in the labor market means, under this equilibrium, that unions internalize the congestion that
the search for a job of a particular agent has on the other searchers’s behavior of the same type.
This means that now, in contrast to the decentralized equilibrium, the probability for a worker
of type j finding a job, mj,t is not taken parametrically. Instead the union has the capacity of
setting wages considering the effect that an additional worker provoke on the probability of the
others of finding a job.
The income value of employment for the union of workers of type j is now:
(rt+1 − δ)Wj,t + η·mj,t+1Wj,t+1 = wj,t+1 +Wj,t+1 −Wj,t − λjWj,t+1 (1.17)
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where again the capital cost of a job,(rt+1 − δ)Wj,t , plus the opportunity cost ,ηmj,t+1Wj,t+1 ,
must equal the yield of holding the job, which is made up of the wage rate, wj,t+1 plus capital
gains, Wj,t+1 −Wj,t net of the risk of losing the job, λjWj,t+1.
The difference between this condition and the one obtained under the decentralized equilib-
rium comes from the opportunity cost and the wages. The opportunity cost is lower, given that
0 < η < 1 because the union internalizes the search externality and makes easier to find a job, at
the cost of a lower wage, which can be obtained by substituting the value functions into the first
order condition of the wage maximization problem. This yields to the optimal wage rate for the
type-j worker:
wj = pFnj + pηaj
vj
uj
for j = s, u (1.18)
which means, that in this scenario the type-j worker is rewarded for his contribution to output
and for the saving in the hiring costs the firm enjoys when the match is created. The difference
in wages with respect to the decentralized equilibrium relies on the parameter η.
We can define the equilibrium for this economy or intermediate bargaining equilibrium, as a
set of infinite sequences for the rental price of equipment {rt}, wage rates {wut, wst}, employment
levels {nut, nst}, capital {kt}, vacancies {vu,t, vs,t}, arrival rates {mut,mst,} and matching rates
{µut, µst} such that,
(i) Taking the rental prices and matching rates as given, {kt} and {vu,t, vs,t} maximize the
firms’ profits.
(ii) Taking the rental price of equipment as given, {kt} maximizes capitalists’ lifetime utility.
(iii) Wages are the Nash solution to uncoordinated bargaining problems.
(iv) Taking wages and matching rates, {njt} and {cjt} solve the representative households’
optimization problem.
(v) Matching rates and arrival rates are given by the matching function.
Centralized equilibrium: the economy with a union federation
Now we assume the existence of a union federation that encompasses all sectoral unions in the
economy. The role of the federation is to negotiate wages for both types of workers taking into
account the congestion that the search activity generates. The union federation is also worried
about the distribution and redistribution of income, therefore in its objective function we not
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find the sum of utilities of each type of household but their weighted utilities according to the
following specification of the welfare function:
Max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
cαu,tc
1−α
s,t
]
(1.19)
The income value of employment for the household j,Wj,t solves the following arbitrage con-
dition:
(rt+1 − δ)Wj,t +mj,t+1ηWj,t+1 = θt+1wj,t+1 +Wj,t+1 −Wj,t − λ,jWj,t+1 (1.20)
where again the capital cost of a job,(rt+1 − δ)Wj,t , plus the opportunity cost ,ηmj,t+1Wj,t+1 ,
equals the job’s yield made up of the wage rate, wj,t+1 plus capital gains, Wj,t+1 −Wj,t net of
the risk of losing the job, λjWj,t+1 The difference with the intermediate equilibrium relies in
the wages, there the wages are set so as redistribute income from the high-skilled workers to the
unskilled according to the parameter θt+1 is the shadow price of consumption.
θt+1 = α
(
cs,t+1
cu,t+1
)1−α
= (1− α)
(
cu,t+1
cs,t+1
)α
(1.21)
The optimal wage rate for a type-j worker is given by the following expression:
wj =
1
θ(1 + p) + p
(
pFnj + pηaj
vj
uj
)
for j = s, u (1.22)
We can define the equilibrium for this economy or centralized bargaining equilibrium, as a set
of infinite sequences for the rental price of equipment {rt}, wage rates {wut, wst}, employment
levels {nut, nst}, capital {kt}, vacancies {vu,t, vs,t}, arrival rates {mut,mst} and matching rates
{µut, µst} such that,
(i) Taking the rental prices and matching rates as given, {kt} and {vu,t, vs,t} maximize the
firms’ profits
(ii) Taking the rental price of equipment as given, {kt} maximizes capitalists’ lifetime utility
(iii) Wages are the Nash solution to uncoordinated bargaining problems
(iv) Taking wages, matching rates and weights, {njt} and {cjt} solve the representative
households’ optimization problem
(v) Matching rates and arrival rates are given by the matching function
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1.4 Calibration
We calibrate our model under the centralized equilibrium, which is the one that correspond to
the situation presented by the Scandinavian countries during the period in which wages were
bargained in a centralized way. Once we will have all the parameters, we will use them to
compute the other scenarios. We will use them then as a laboratory able to analyze the impact
of a skill-biased technical change.
The first step is to choose the functional forms for the matching function and the production
technology. The total number of matches at time t, Mt is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching
function in the total number of searchers uj,t, and vacancies, vj,t
Mj,t =Mj,o (uj,t)
η (vj,t)
(1−η) (1.23)
where η determines the elasticity of the matching technology with respect to unemployment and
with respect to vacancies (1−η). The reason for this choice is the empirical literature on frictional
labor markets which finds that the Cobb-Douglas specification of the matching function fits the
well the data.
The production function is the one proposed by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), which
is a CES function in capital and labor with a CES function on the two types of labor:
F (k, ns, nu) =
[
a2k
ρ2 + (1− a2)(a1n
ρ1
s + (1− a1)n
ρ1
u )
ρ2/ρ1
]1/ρ2
(1.24)
where 11−ρ2
denotes the elasticity of substitution between capital and aggregate labor, and
1
1−ρ1
denotes the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. With this specifi-
cation, the skill-biased technical change is represented by changes in the parameter a1.
The second step is to assign values to all the parameters in the model. We set in advance
as many parameters as possible using a priory information and data for the Swedish economy
for the period 1970-1980, period that corresponds to the functioning of a fully fledge centralized
system of wage bargaining. We set the discount factor equal to 0.95. The rate of depreciation of
capital, δ, is calibrate so that it corresponds to an annual interest rate of 13 per cent. Following
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) the estimated elasticity of substitution between capital an
labor is not statistically significantly different from 1, which implies a value for ρ2 approximately
equal to zero and a value for ρ1 that corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between the
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two types of labor of 1.25, these values will help us to calibrate the other two parameters in the
production function, a1 and a2 The remaining parameters, which correspond to the cost of posting
a vacancy for the unskilled workers, au, and for the skilled workers as, the exogenous destruction
rate for unskilled and skilled workers, λu and λs, the elasticity of the matching technology with
respect to unemployment, η, the bargaining power of the federation, p, and the weight given to
the unskilled workers by the federation, αu are calibrated so as to match the following average
values in equilibrium: an unemployment rate for the skilled and unskilled workers of 0.5% and
2.3%, a capital share on income of 30 per cent and a log-wage differential of 0.5. The number
of unskilled workers is set in such a way that the fraction of labor force with university degree
would be 5 per cent of the total population. Thus, we assume that xs = 0.05 and xu = 0.95.
Thus, the parameter values used in the model are presented in the following table:
Workers Capitalists Technology Matching
xu = 0.95 β = 0.95 ρ1 = 0.209 au = 0.072
x
S
= 0.05 δ = 0.08 ρ2 = 0.002 as = 0.104
p = 0.6 r = 0.13 a1 = 0.14 λu = 0.02
αj = 0.93 a2 = 0.04 λs = 0.05
η = 0.5
The fact that the parameter of the matching function η = 0.5 differs from the bargaining
power p = 0.6, imply there is no symmetry between unions and firms, and therefore is consistent
with our assumption that unions extract rents from the firms. It implies as well that the Hosios
condition for efficiency does not hold and yields room for the possibility of talking about efficient
unions as entities which internalize the externality that searchers generate among themselves.
1.5 Results
We now examine the consequences of a skill-biased technical change that favor workers with higher
levels of education, so that firms will increase the demand for this specific type of worker. In our
model, this will be materialized by an increase in the marginal productivity of skilled workers
relative to the unskilled, equivalent to an increase in the parameter a1 of the production function.
To properly choose the values of this parameters, we focus again on the Swedish economy but for
a different period, in particular the late eighties when the technical change has already affected
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the economy. The new values for xs and xu will be 0.15 and 0.85, respectively. This means that
now 15 per cent of the labor force possesses a university degree, in contrast to the 5 per cent
before the skill-biased technical change shocked the economy. The parameter a1, which measures
the intensity of the shock moves from 0.14 to 0.23.
With these new values and keeping constant the remainder parameters, we calculate the
welfare for each type of worker under the three different scenarios and also before and after the
skill-biased technical change has shocked the economy to analyze whether there is any difference or
substantial change. What we observe is that after the shock the skilled workers have an incentive
to leave the union federation and to move towards more decentralized systems of wage bargaining.
But let us explain it in more detail. We use the present discount values of consumption to compute
welfare, Wf. The following table presents the welfare values Wf for each type of worker.
Level of centralization in the wage setting process
Centralized Intermediate Decentralized
Before Wfs = 0.96 Wfs = 0.88 Wfs = 0.93
the SBTC Wfu = 0.57 Wfu = 0.55 Wfu = 0.56
After Wfs = 0.97 Wfs = 0.91 Wfs = 0.98
the SBTC Wfu = 0.13 Wfu = 0.12 Wfu = 0.128
Before the introduction of the SBTC, both skilled and unskilled workers prefer centralized
systems of wage bargaining to any others. This preference is not surprising for the unskilled
workers for whom the two forces interacting in this model go in the same direction. On the
one hand there is an increase in welfare generated by the efficiency gain when internalizing the
search externality and on the other hand, the redistribution from the skilled to unskilled workers
increase their welfare as well. What happens for the skilled workers is that, the gain in efficiency
generated by the internalization of the search externality is able to compensate the lose generated
by the redistribution.
Nevertheless, the situation changes after the introduction of the SBTC. The welfare of the
unskilled workers decreases dramatically. In spite of it, they still prefer the centralized option.
But the lose that now the redistributive effect generates over the skilled worker’s welfare is not
compensated by the gain generated with the internalization of the search externality, so they are
the ones who have an incentive to leave the coalition.
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We can say that the underlying explanation is that skilled workers cross subsidize unskilled
workers through the bargaining decisions. This situation is sustainable in the case in which the
productivity gap among these two types of workers is not very high and the relative sizes differ
substantially. The presence of a skill-biased technical change that increase the productivity gap
and also the relative number of skilled workers over the unskilled undermine the coalition.
Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) find that when unions play an efficiency-enhancing
role, deunionization may happen inefficiently in the sense that skilled workers ignore the positive
effect that they are generating on the unskilled through the redistribution and tend to deunionize
too soon. Similar results can be extracted from our work because there is room for a reduction in
the rate of redistribution from skilled to unskilled workers which could have generated increases
in welfare for both types of workers.
It is worth noting that our result is also in line with the theories of endogenous formation of
coalitions in which two groups of heterogeneous workers may form either a joint union or two
separate unions depending on their relative size and productivity of the two groups. Since, in
these models, the workers’ bargaining power comes from the loss that they can impose on the firm
by refusing to work, they will form a single union when the two types of workers are substitutes
because separate unions will have less bargaining power. In this sense, we can see a skill-biased
technical change as a way of "heterogeneize" workers and reduce the substitutability among them.
There are other interesting observations we can extract from the table above. The first one is
that both the very decentralized and the very centralized case work better than the intermediate
case. We can interpret this result in line with the hump-shaped curve proposed by Calmfors and
Driffill (1988) who, as we stated in the introduction of the paper, find that intermediate levels of
centralization yield the worst outcome in terms of macroeconomic performance. The idea behind
their study, stated as well by Olson (1982) is that under intermediate levels of wage bargaining,
"organized interest are strong enough to cause major disruptions but not sufficient to take into
account the costs of their actions for the society".
Furthermore, wage compression arises in the presence of unions. This result is interesting in
the sense that we have not imposed it but results as an outcome of the way in which we have
modellized unions.
An interesting extension of the model could rely on the modelization of the second scenario,
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the intermediate level of wage bargaining. Usually intermediate levels are identified with sectoral
or industrial wage negotiations. In this paper, we have adopted a particular intermediate level:
a horizontal unionization, and although this systems existed in practice, for example UK, they
are not the main representation of intermediate levels, sectoral bargaining could represent most
of the central and southern European bargaining negotiations. Modelization of sectoral matching
model with unions can be found in Delacroix(2004). Nevertheless, this intermediate level is a
secondary issue in our work because we just use it for comparative reasons. The same result will
hold even if we eliminate this scenario and use only the two extremes.
1.6 Conclusion
With this paper we contribute to the recent literature on deunionization and decentralization
in the wage setting process. During the eighties several OECD countries witnessed a process of
decentralization in their wage setting negotiations. This fact could seem surprising if we take
into account that the macroeconomic performance of economies with highly centralized systems
of wage bargaining have benefit from it.
This paper first calls the attention of this fact and tries to look for an explanation of why a
system that perform so well in terms of macroeconomic variables and result so appealing from
outside collapses. We answer this question through a model in which unions act as coalitions of
workers that bargain wages with the firms. Unions extract rents from the firms along the bargain
process at the same time as they play an efficiency enhancing role taking into consideration the
congesting effect that searchers generate over each other.
We embed these unions into a simple search-matching framework to show that, for the val-
ues obtained under the calibration, a skill-biased technical change increases the productivity
gap across heterogeneous workers and generate the collapse of very centralized systems of wage
bargaining characterized by high levels of redistribution across workers.
This result is in line with the evolution of different labor systems with highly levels of central-
ization in their wage setting processes. If we follow the performance of the Swedish labor market
we see that along the centralized period, most of the high skilled workers were slowly leaving the
coalition. The skill biased technical change contributes to the end of a system that, although
very appealing from outside was generating some tensions inside.
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present and estimate via maximum likelihood a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model (DSGE) with frictional labor markets for the US economy. The labor market
is modelled adopting the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) matching framework.
We extend the Andolfatto (1996) model with a number of additional structural shocks in order
to evaluate how each of these help accounting for cyclical variations in labor market indicators
and other key macroeconomic aggregates. Following Bencivenga (1992) we introduce a preference
shock in the utility function; an investment-specific technology shock like the one in Fisher(2006);
and a job separation shock in the spirit of Shimer (2005). We estimate the parameters of the
model via maximum likelihood. This alternative to the more conventional calibration offers some
potential advantages. First of all, when models have a large number of parameters, standard
calibration does not seem the best technique given that neither the focus on a limited set of
moments nor the transfer of microeconomic estimates from one model to another would provide
the discipline to quantify the behavior of the model. Second, a DSGE model, once estimated can
be used to generate forecasts and can be used to decompose the k-step-ahead forecast error vari-
ances of the variables into different orthogonal components attributables to each of the structural
shocks already mentioned. This second part is very useful to identify which shocks are driving
the cyclical fluctuations of the different variables.
We estimate the parameters of the model and the stochastic processes governing the structural
shocks using six key macro-economic time series in the US economy: real GDP, consumption,
investment, total hours worked, productivity and tightness. Following standard mechanisms for
maximum likelihood, we estimate the model by maximizing a numerical approximation of the
likelihood function based on the application of the Kalman filter to the linearized state-space
representation of the theoretical DSGE model.
Several results are worth highlighting. First, the estimation procedure yields a plausible set
of estimates for the structural parameters of the model. An important parameter is the one that
corresponds to the power of the workers in the Nash-bargaining process, which instead of taking
the standard one half, takes a much smaller value of about 0.103, close to the value proposed by
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006). Other important parameters are those governing the structural
shocks. In all cases, they are quite persistent and more volatile than what is standard in the
literature.
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Second, we analyze the effects of the already mentioned structural shocks on the main variables
on the model using impulse-responses functions. Overall, we find that qualitatively those effects
are in line with the existing evidence.
Finally, there are two structural shocks that explain a significant fraction of output: the
neutral and the investment specific technology shocks. In addition to these technology shocks,
the preference shock is an important determinant of consumption and investment mainly in the
short run, whereas the shock to job destruction is more successful in explaining the variance of
tightness
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section
3 we discuss the estimation methodology and present the main results. Section 4, analyzes the
impulse responses of the various structural shocks and their contribution to the fluctuation of
the variables. Finally, Section 5 presents some of the main conclusions we can draw from our
analysis.
2.2 The model
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents. Workers and firms engage in
employment relationships. As in Andolfatto (1996), we assume that each household is populated
by many individuals who can be either employed or unemployed and insure each other completely
against idiosyncratic risks.
The labor market is frictional. We adopt the basic Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) matching
framework. Workers and firms search for a partner to generate a productive job. The total
number of matches in the economy per unit of time Mt is given by the following Cobb-Douglas
function
Mt = χV
α
t (eUt)
(1−α) (2.1)
where Vt represents the total number of vacancies open by the firms per unit of time t, Ut denotes
the amount of searchers per unit of time t and the constant e implies that search effort is constant
in this economy.
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We assume that all unemployed workers search for a partner. The probability for a searcher
of finding a vacant job can be obtained from the matching function as µt =
Mt
ut
. Equally the
probability that a vacancy gets filled per unit of time is given by qt =
Mt
vt
.
Employment is a predetermined variable, whose law of motion is given by the following equa-
tion.
Nt+1 = Nt − σtNt +Mt (2.2)
i.e. the stock of employment in a certain period is equal to the stock of employment in the period
before minus the flow of workers who have lost their jobs with the exogenous probability σt plus
the flow of searches that have been matched and thus move from unemployment to employment.
Households and preferences - The representative household has preferences over consump-
tion and leisure defined through the following expected utility function
E
{
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
dt log(Ct) +Ntφ1
(1−Ht)
(1−η)
(1− η)
+ Utφ2
(1− e)(1−η)
(1− η)
]}
(2.3)
where the discount factor satisfies 0 < β < 1 and φi > 0, for i = 1, 2. Ct denotes consumption, Ht
denotes the number of hours worked and dt represents the preference shock whose law of motion
follows this AR process:
ln(dt+1) = ρd ln(dt) + (1− ρd) ln(d) + ε
d
t+1 (2.4)
The representative household will maximize utility function above subject to the following budget
constraint:
Ct + It = wtNtHt + rtKt +Πt (2.5)
this means that the household has to decide how to split current income, made up of capital
income rtKt, profits Πt and the wage bill wtNtHt, between consumption Ct and investment It.
The law of motion for capital is given by the following equation:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +XtIt (2.6)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate. Now in contrast to more standard specifications there
is an investment-specific technology shock represented by Xt that is defined by the following
specification:
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ln
Xt+1
Xt
=ρx ln
Xt
Xt−1
+(1− ρx) ln γx+ε
x
t+1
Production sector and technology - The representative firm produces an aggregate good
Yt with capital and labor according to a constant returns to scale technology described by a
Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = AtK
θ
t (ztTt)
1−θ (2.7)
where 0 < θ < 1. Kt denotes capital and Tt denotes labor input and is equal to the number of
workers Nt times the number of hours worked by each of them Ht. zt represents the deterministic
growth rate of the economy, which is equal to equal to γt, where γ > 11. The technology level is
represented by At, which follows a first order autorregresive process:
ln(At+1) = ρ ln(At) + (1− ρ) ln(A) + ε
a
t+1 (2.8)
where A > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1. The serially uncorrelated innovation εat is normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation σa.
The firm hires capital and opens vacancies to maximize the expected present value of cash
flows
∑
t=0
∆t[F (At,Kt, ztTt)−wtNtHt + rtKt − aVt] (2.9)
where a denotes the cost of opening a vacancy, and ∆ represents the discount factor for the firm,
which can be stated as where ∆ = β
Uct+1
Uct
.
When maximizing this problem, the firm takes into account the law of motion of employment
specified in equation (2) considering that Mt = qtvt. In our specification the job destruction
probability σ becomes stochastic. In particular, it is defined through the following AR process:
lnσt+1= ρσ lnσt+(1− ρσ) lnσ+ε
σ
t+1
1This implies that our variables, except those related to hours and vacancies, grow at the common rate γ in
steady state. Therefore, data is automatically detrended as part of the estimation process and we do not need to
filter it with other methods such as H-P filter or B-P filter, etc.
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Optimal contract - Wages are obtained through Nash bargaining. Denoting as p the bar-
gaining power of the workers, the optimal contract is obtained as
wtlt = p
(
F2lt + a
vt
ut
)
− (1− p)
(
φ1
λt
(1− lt)
(1−η)
1− η
−
φ2
λt
(1− e)(1−η)
1− η
)
(2.10)
this means, that the optimal contract is a weighted sum of two elements, the first one is the
labor’s yields plus the savings in vacancy posting for the firm and the second is the reservation
wage of the households.
The optimal number of hours per worker is given by the following equation
∂St
∂lt
= F2 −
φ1
λt
(1− lt)
−η = 0 (2.11)
where St denotes the surplus of the match and F2 = (1− θ)
yt
ntlt
Equilibrium - To obtain the equilibrium allocation for this economy, we first need to de-
trend the growing variables of this economy defined as yt = Yt/zt, ct = Ct/zt, it = It/zt, kt+1 =
Kt+1/zt, ht = Ht, nt = Nt,mt =Mt.
When the vector εt = 0 the economy converges to a steady state in which all the detrended
variables remain constant. Appendix A describes the equilibrium for this economy. It also
contains the log-linearizations of the non linear system around this steady-state. We apply the
"Toolkit" method proposed by Uhlig (1997) to the log-linearized system to obtain a solution of
the form:
xt = Pxt−1 +Qzt
yt = Rxt−1 + Sat
at+1 = Nat−1 + εt+1
This system describes the recursive equilibrium law of motion of the real business cycle model
where xt and yt represent vectors of logarithmic deviations of the endogenous states and the
control variables from their steady-state levels. at represents the logarithmic deviation of the
exogenous states. More precisely,
xt =
[
ln
(
kt
k∗
)
ln
(
nt
n∗
)
ln
(
ut
u∗
)]
′
yt =
[
ln
(
ct
c∗
)
ln
(
it
i∗
)
ln
(
wt
w∗
)
ln
(
vt
v∗
)
ln
(
θt
θ∗
)
ln
(
mt
m∗
)
ln
(
ht
h∗
)
ln
(
tt
t∗
)]
′
at = [at dt σt]
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The system above can be easily written in a more general form:
st+1 = Ast +Bεt+1 (2.12)
yt = Cst (2.13)
where st+1 =
(
xt at+1
)′
A =
 P Q
0 N
 B =
 0
1
 and C = ( R S )
The matrices A, B and C depend on the structural parameters of the model β, φ1, φ2, η, a,
ξ, θ, σ, ρa, ε
a, ρd, ε
d, ρx, ε
x, ρσ, ε
σ, χ and α.To estimate those parameters, we have to transform the
theoretical model into a state-space empirical representation. As we will see, we do not need to
estimate all of them given that some of them can be obtained as combinations of the others and
the steady-state variables. In the following section, we transform the theoretical model into a
state-space empirical representation and estimate those parameters.
2.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Model
There are various ways of giving values to the parameters of a DSGE model. According to Geweke
(1999), there is a weak econometric interpretation and a strong econometric interpretation. Under
the former case, the parameters of the model are calibrated in a way that some selected theoretical
moments of the model match those of the data2. These methods allow the researcher to focus on
the characteristics in the data for which the DSGE model is more relevant but have the problem
of focusing on a limited set of moments instead of using all the information contained in the data.
The strong interpretation case attempts to provide a full characterization of the observed data
series and when successful it allows for proper specification testing and forecasting. In this paper,
we follow this strong interpretation and as in Altug (1989), Sargent (1978) or Ireland (2001, 2004)
among others, we apply Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
Maximum Likelihood provides a systematic procedure to estimate the parameters of interest.
Except in a few cases, there is no analytical or numerical procedure to directly evaluate the
likelihood function of our DSGE, but we can transform the theoretical model into a state-space
econometric model and assuming that the shocks to the economy are normally distributed and the
2A number of papers have estimated the parameters of DSGE models by these moment-matching estimation.
See, for instance, Hansen (1997), Rotenberg and Woodford (1998) or Christiano et. al. (2001)
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policy functions of the model are approximated linearly, we can look for a numerical approximation
of the likelihood function with the help of the Kalman filter. In what follows we explain this in
more detail.
2.3.1 Transformation of the theoretical model
State-space Representation - As Ireland (2004) and Ingram et.al.(1994) explain, the fact
there are less shocks in the economy that number of time series used in the estimation, makes
the model stochastically singular.
There are two common approaches to deal with this problem. The first one consists of
increasing the number of structural shocks in the model until we have the same number of shocks
as time series used in the estimation; the second approach, which is the one we use here, consists
of augmenting the equation (2.13) of the system above with an error term or measurement error
proposed in Altug(1989) or Ireland (2004). These residuals represent the movements in the data
that the theory does not explain (those movements that are not generated by the shocks specified
in the model).
The state-space representation of the theoretical model above is given by the following equa-
tions (2.14)-(2.18)
st+1 = Fst + V εt+1 (2.14)
yt = Gst +met (2.15)
where met is a vector of measurement errors uncorrelated across variables, st represents the state
vector, ft denotes the vector of observable variables at time t, F and G are again matrices of
parameters. The first equation of the system is known as the state equation and the second called
the observation equation. Vectors εt and met are white noise vectors with:
E[εtε
′
t]= Q. (2.16)
E[metme
′
t]= R. (2.17)
E[εtme
′
t]= 0 (2.18)
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State-space econometric models allow for the evaluation of the likelihood function using the
Kalman filter algorithm explained in detail in Hamilton (1994, Chapter 13). The Kalman filter
takes the observations of ft for t = 1, ..T as inputs and works recursively to construct implied
series of forecast errors. The application of the Kalman filter lets us calculate the numerical
approximation of the log-likelihood function of the model as follows
ln(L) = −
3T
2
ln(2π)−
1
2
T∑
t=1
ln
∣∣GΣtG′∣∣− 1
2
T∑
t=1
w′t
(
GΣtG
′
)−1
wt (2.19)
where G comes directly from equation (14) and Σ is obtained from the application of the Kalman
filter.
This likelihood function can be evaluated for any given set of parameter values. Making use
of a numerical search algorithm one can find the set of parameters that maximize the likelihood
function. Usually, maximum likelihood estimations are criticized because it is very difficult to
be sure whether we are in the global maximum or on the contrary we are just in a local one,
given that the likelihood function displays a quite sinuous pattern. To avoid this criticism with
our estimations we borrow from physics another algorithm called "simulated annealing" . This
is a generic probabilistic meta-algorithm for the global optimization problem, i.e. it looks for a
good approximation to the global optimum of a function in a large search space (as is the case
of the likelihood function). Each step of the simulated annealing algorithm replaces the current
solution by a random "nearby" solution. The allowance for these movements saves the method
from becoming stuck at a local minimum.
In principle, this algorithm is allowed to select values of the parameters lying anywhere be-
tween the positive and the negative infinity. But to ensure that our parameters satisfy the
theoretical restrictions of the model listed in section 2, we have to impose additional constraints3.
Computing standard-errors - Often, algorithms for computing maximum likelihood esti-
mates have the drawback that they do not produce standard errors. This means that we should
also look for numerical approximations of the derivatives of the likelihood function so as to com-
pute the information matrix and from it, the standard errors.
3 In particular, some of ours parameters are constrained to be positive, so we constraint the algorithm to work
with absolute values. Many of ours parameters are probabilities that should lie between zero and one, so we again
constraint the algorithm to work with the logistic transformation of these parameters.
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Fortunately, if certain regularity conditions hold4, the maximum likelihood estimates are
consistent and asymptotically normal. Under these circumstances, the information matrix for a
sample of size T can be calculated from the second derivatives of the maximized log-likelihood
function as
IT= −
1
T
{
T∑
t=1
∂2 logL(yt, θ)
∂θ ∂θ′
}
(2.20)
Standard errors are then the square roots of the diagonal elements of 1T (IT )
−1. This matrix
has elements of very different magnitudes and therefore, the reported standard errors should be
interpreted with caution.
2.3.2 The Data
Data is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database, data for gross domestic
income and wages is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Appendix B presents a table
with detailed information about each series. Monthly data has been transformed into quarterly
data using averages. The sample period is 1964-1 to 2005-4.
When the model takes the form of a state-space representation, it can be estimated via
maximum likelihood once analogs to the model’s variables are found in the data. Therefore, Ct is
defined as real personal consumption on non durables and services plus government expenditure.
Investment, It is defined as the sum of purchases of durable consumption plus private sector
fixed investment. Vacancies, Vt are proxied by a widely used index which reflects the number of
"help-wanted" advertisement registered in US newspapers. Nt comes directly from the number
of civilian employment, and thus unemployment can be computed as 1 − Nt. All the variables
have been divided by the civilian population aged 16 or over, so as to have them in per capita
terms.
Making the data comparable with the variables of the model - To properly evaluate
the likelihood function, one more transformation of the data is needed. Data series should be
4These conditions include that the model must be identified, the eigenvalues of A lie inside the unit circle, the
true values of the estimations do not fall on a boundary of the allowable parameter space and that variables xt
behave asymptotically like a full-rank linearly indeterministic covariance-stationary process
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comparable with the vectors of logarithmic deviations of the variables from their steady-state
levels. Thus, we have to use the definitions:
ĉt = log(ct)− log(c)
ît = log(it)− log(i)
P̂rt = log(Pr t)− log(Pr)− t log(γ)
t̂t = log(tt)− log(t)
θ̂t = log(θt)− log(θ)
for all t = 1, 2...T . Remember that to solve the problem we have normalized output to 1, so
consumption and investment here are defined as ĉt =
(̂
cd,t
yt
)
. and ît =
(̂
id,t
yt
)
. Productivity, Pr, is
growing at rate γ in steady state. Once those transformations are made, the vector of observables
is given by:
ft=
[
ĉt ît t̂t P̂ dt θ̂t
]
2.3.3 Parameter estimates
As in Altug(1989) and Ireland (2004), we keep fixed the value of some parameters of the model
for which the estimation yields unreasonable results. Those parameters are the representative
household discount factor β, the capital share of output θ, and the depreciation rate δ.
As Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005) point out there are some aspects of the calibration
of the standard matching model that are relatively uncontroversial whereas some other aspects
deserve special attention.
We directly fix those "uncontroversial values" that correspond to those mentioned above. We
set the discount factor β equal to 0.99. The depreciation rate of capital, δ, is calibrated so that
it corresponds to an annual depreciation of around 10 percent. And the capital share of output,
θ, is set equal to 0.36.
The estimated values for the "controversial parameters": α, ρ, ε, η, p, σ, γ and their standard
errors are presented in the Table 1.
As one can observe, the estimates of the DSGE model’s parameters seem quite reasonable.
The parameter α from the matching function decreases its value from 0.6 in Andolfatto (1996) to
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0.2. The parameters driving the technology shock adopt a value of 0.914 instead of the traditional
0.95, which means that in this model the TFP shock shows a smaller persistence. In contrast
the variance is larger, in particular the parameter εa moves from 0.007 to 0.009. The remaining
shocks of the model are also quite persistent, with values of ρ around 0.9. The less volatile shock
is the investment-specific technology shock whose εx takes a value of 0.005.
Table 1: Results from the estimation
Parameter Definition Estimated Value Standard Error
α elasticity of vacancies 0.200 0.0274
ρa persistence of the TFP shock 0.914 0.0155
εa variance of the TFP shock 0.009 0.0001
ρd persistence preference shock 0.897 0.0160
εd variance preference shock 0.010 0.0013
ρσ persistence job destruction shock 0.900 0.0037
εσ variance job destruction shock 0.010 0.0003
ρi persistence inv-spec shock 0.885 0.0091
εi variance inv-spec shock 0.005 0.0001
p workers’ bargaining power 0.103 0.0020
η parameter utility function 3.398 0.0025
γz rate of growth - labor augmenting 1.005 0.0001
γi rate of. growth - investment 1.005 0.0001
mec measurement error 0.0001 0.0004
mei measurement error 0.0001 0.0003
met measurement error 0.051 0.0137
mep measurement error 0.050 0.0192
meθ measurement error 0.049 0.0001
The estimate γz = 1.005 corresponds to an annualized growth rate of real per-capita output in
the model around 2%. Nevertheless, more interesting for our purposes are the estimations of the
variables related to the labor market. The value of the worker’s bargaining power takes a value
of 0.103 instead of the 0.5 proposed by Nash (1959). This means that the power of an isolated
worker in the bargaining of his wage is smaller than the power of the hiring firm. It goes also in
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the direction proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006). The value of the parameter of the
utility function η is estimated to 3.398 and is larger than the one calibrated in Andolfatto (1996)
that corresponds to 2.197. This parameter is important in the sense that drives the trade-off
between the intensive and the extensive margin of labor input.
Measurement errors for investment and tightness take larger values than the others. This is
consistent with the fact that those series are the most volatile. Not surprisingly, productivity and
total hours worked measurement errors have similar values. Finally and in spite of the fact that
standard errors have had to be approximated numerically, they take very small values making
significant all the values of our estimation.
The remainder of the parameters can be obtained directly from the estimations above and
the steady-state values of the variables. They are shown in the table below:
Table 2: Other parameters of the model
Parameter Value Explanation
1− α 0.80 prob. of downgrade of skills
χ 1.137 efficiency paramet. matching function
ξ 1.359 parameter production function
a 0.105 cost of posting a vacancy
φ1 1.221 parameter in the utility function
φ2 0.325 parameter in the utility function
2.4 Which shocks are important?
In this section we analyze which shocks are important in driving the empirical business cycle
fluctuations of the main variables of the model according to the US data used in the estimation
of the parameters of the model.
2.4.1 Impulse response analysis
Graphs 1 to 4 of Appendix C, plot the impulse-response functions to the structural shocks included
in the model, i.e. a preference shock; a job-separation shock; an investment-specific technology
shock and a productivity shock.
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Graph 1 shows that following a positive productivity shock, consumption, investment and
employment rise. Wages and vacancies rise as well. Positive productivity shocks raise output in
all matches but do not affect the rate at which employed workers lose their jobs. Interesting is
the response of tightness which shows a more satisfactory performance than what is usual in this
type of models. On the contrary, the response of the variable hours worked fluctuates around its
steady-state value more than expected.
Graph 2 shows the effects of a job separation shock. An increase in the separation rate,
increases separations and reduces employment duration. As a direct consequence, the unemploy-
ment rate increases and vacancies increase as well. The final effect is an increase in tightness.
Consumption and output fall while the number of hours worked by the survival matches increase,
counterweighting only partially the negative effect that the job destruction shock has on the ex-
tensive margin. The total effect on labor input is negative as one can see from the fall in the
impulse-response function of total hours worked.
Graph 3 shows that a positive preference shock, while increasing consumption and output
significantly, has an initial crowding-out effect on investment. Nevertheless, to satisfy this higher
demand it is necessary to increase capacity and consequently, it generates an increase in employ-
ment and a recuperation of investment via capital.
Finally, graph 4 shows, the effects of an investment-specific technology shock. Following a
positive shock, investment increases whereas consumption decreases substantially, given that a
larger fraction of output is initially devoted to investment. Vacancies increase but in a smaller
extent than the increase experimented by the other three shocks above. Both employment and
hours worked increase substantially. As a consequence, labor input increase. Wages fall initially
and slightly recover afterwards.
2.4.2 Variance decomposition
Maximum Likelihood estimation and the state-space representation of the model allow to perform
a variance decomposition analysis to identify which shocks are more important in driving the
empirical business cycle fluctuations of the variables of the model presented in section 2.
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The contribution of each of the structural shocks to the forecast error variance of the main
variables of the model at various horizons: short run: one quarter ahead and 1 year - 4 quarters-;
medium term: 2 years -8 quarters- and long run: 5 years -20 quarters- and their standard errors
are shown in Table 3 of the Appendix D.
Standard errors also appear in Table 3 and show the statistical uncertainty surrounding the
model’s ability to explain the observed data. In our model, this statistical uncertainty is smaller
than what has been previously suggested by Altug (1989) or Ireland (2004), this might be due to
the introduction of other shocks different to the standard technology shock proposed by the real
business cycle model.
Let us first focus on the determinants of output. At the one-year horizon, output variations are
driven primarily by the neutral technology shock. In the medium term, the two technology shocks
(neutral and investment-specific) together account for almost all of the forecast error variance.
In the long-run, the neutral technology shock dominates, but the investment-specific technology
shock accounts for about 40% of the forecast error in output. This pattern is somehow surprising
given that standard RBC models usually explain very high and very low frequency movements
in output, but is less successful in explaining quarter-to-quarter movements. The introduction of
additional shocks changes this behavior.
With respect to the determinants of consumption, the investment-specific technology shock
accounts for more than 80% of the unconditional variance in detrended consumption and almost
54% of the one-quarter-ahead forecast error. In the short run the preference shock plays an
important role accounting for more than 35% of the one-quarter-ahead forecast error variance in
output but it looses importance over time, showing a pattern opposite to the technology shock.
The shock to job destruction plays an almost negligible impact.
Focusing on investment, the investment-specific technology shock accounts for about 30% on
average of the k-step-ahead forecast error variances for values of k ranging from 4 to 20. The
neutral technology shock accounts for almost another 50% (48.36%) of the unconditional variance
in detrended investment, although its importance increases in the medium term. Finally, the
preference shock can also account for part of the short run variation in investment, losing its
importance over time.
The unconditional variance in total hours is mainly explained by the preference and the
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investment-specific technology shocks. Nevertheless, in the short run there must be other forces,
different from the shocks aforementioned driving the fluctuations of this variable.
Finally, we focus on the determinants of tightness. The shock to job destruction, accounts
for almost 10% of the unconditional variance, almost 20% of the one-quarter-ahead forecast error
variance and around 23% of the k-step-ahead for k ranging from 4 to 12. The neutral technology
shock explains almost 50% of the one quarter ahead forecast error variance but its importance
decreases over time. The fact that the technology shock does not play an important role, shows
that there are other forces driving the tightness’ cyclical fluctuations different from the one
proposed in the standard RBC model. The investment-specific technology shock accounts for
most of the unconditional variance.
Summarizing these results, there are two structural shocks that explain a most of the cyclical
fluctuations of the variables in the model: the neutral and the investment specific technology
shocks.
In addition, the preference shock is an important determinant of consumption and investment.
This preference shock explains a significant portion of the fluctuations of the variables in the short
run, while is less successful in the long run.
It is worth noting that in explaining the variance of tightnes, in addition to the technology
shocks, both neutral and investment-specific, the shock to job destruction plays a significant role
mainly at the business cycle frequency. This could explain why standard RBC models are not
satisfactory when replicating the volatility of unemployment and vacancies.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE)
with frictional labor markets and four structural shocks. Beyond the standard neutral technology
shock, we introduce a preference shock in the utility function, an investment-specific technology
shock and a job separation shock.
We estimate the parameters of the model via maximum likelihood for the US economy, using
six key macro-economic time series. Overall, the estimates seem quite reasonable, although in
some cases differ from the values traditionally considered as standard.
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The variance-decomposition analysis show that there are two structural shocks that explain
a significant fraction of the variance of the main variables of the model: the neutral and the
investment specific technology shocks. In addition, the preference shock explains a portion of
consumption and investment in the short run.
It is worth noting that in explaining the variance of tightnes, in addition to the technology
shocks, both neutral and investment-specific, the shock to job destruction plays a significant role
mainly at the business cycle frequency. This could explain why standard RBC models are not
satisfactory when replicating the volatility of unemployment and vacancies.
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2.A Appendix: Solving for the equilibrium of the model
2.A.1 Households
Households maximize the following problem with respect to {Ct,Kt+1}
∞
t=0
Max
{
∞∑
t=0
β
[
dt logCt +Ntφ1
(1−Lt)
(1−η)
1− η
+ (1−Nt)φ2
(1− et)
(1−η)
1− η
]}
subject to (1) the resource constraint
Ct + It = gtwtNtLt + rtKt +Πt
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +XtIt
ln dt+1 = ρd ln dt + (1− ρd) ln d+ ε
d
t+1
ln
xt+1
xt
= ρx ln
xt
xt−1
+ (1− ρx) ln
x
x
+ εxt+1
and an initial condition (k0)
The growth rates of the different variables along the balanced growth path can be derived as
follows. First the exogenous variables Zt and Xt grow at the gross rates γz and γx, respectively.
From the resource constraint and the accumulation of capital equation, it follows that Yt, Ct, It
and At all have to grow at the same rate gt. Capital, Kt, however grows faster, at a rate of gγx.
Finally, the production function implies that gt = γzγ
θ
1−θ
x . Thus, the following conditions hold
for balanced growth:
gt = γzγ
θ
1−θ
x
and
gkt = γzγ
θ
1−θ
x γx = γzγ
1
1−θ
x
Detrended variables may be defined as ct =
Ct
gt
, it =
It
gt
, lt = Lt, nt = Nt, kt+1 =
Kt+1
gkt
and the
detrended maximization problem could be written as shown in eq.
subject to (1) the detrended resource constraint
ct + it = wtntlt + rtktxt−1 + πt
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the law of motion for capital
γzγx
θ
1−θ kt+1 = (1− δ)ktγ
−1
x + it
and the autorregresive processes for the shocks
lndt+1 = ρd ln dt + (1− ρd) ln d+ ε
d
t+1
ln
xt+1
xt
= ρx ln
xt
xt−1
+ (1− ρx) ln
x
x
+ εxt+1
where γx,t =
xt
xt−1
Exploiting the recursive structure of the problem one may equivalently reformulate it in terms
of a dynamic program. Let s = (k) denote the current period capital stock and employment rate or
state vector of this economy system. Let s0 denote an arbitrary initial condition and let primed
variables denote "next period" values. The value function W satisfies the following Bellman
equation
W (s) = max
c,k′
{
dt log ct + ntφ1
(1− lt)
(1−η)
1− η
+ (1− nt)φ2
(1− e)(1−η)
1− η
+ βE
[
W (s′)
]}
subject to the constraint
ct + γzγx
θ
1−θ kt+1 − (1− δ)ktγx
−1 = wtntlt + rtktxt−1 + πt
letting λ denote the multiplier associated the constraint above. Therefore, the first order condi-
tions, assuming interior solution, can be expressed as follows:
• w.r.t. consumption (c)
dt
ct
− λt = 0
• w.r.t. capital (k′)
βE [Wk(st+1)]− λt = 0
• constraint () holding with equality
ct + γzγx
θ
1−θ kt+1 − (1− δ)ktγx
−1 = wtntlt + rtktxt−1 + πt
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From the envelope theorem, one derives
Wk(st) = λt
[
(1− δ) γx
−1 + rtxt−1
]
Therefore the optimal decision for the household comes from:
dt
ct
γzγx
θ
1−θ = βE
{
dt+1
ct+1
[
(1− δ)γx
−1 + rt+1xt
]}
2.A.2 Firms
Firms maximize the following
Max
∞∑
t=0
∆t [F (Kt, NtLt, zt)− gtwtNtLt − rtKt − gtatVt]
subject to the law of motion for employment
Nt+1 = (1− σt)Nt + qtVt
where
F (Kt, NtLt, zt) = ζAtK
θ
t (ztNtLt)
(1−θ)
and the law of motion for the productivity shock follows the following AR process
ln at+1 = ρa ln at + (1− ρa) lna+ ε
a
t+1
lnσt+1 = ρσ lnσt + (1− ρσ) lnσ + ε
σ
t+1
and where zt = γtz
As before, detrended variables can be defined as lt = Lt, nt = Nt, kt+1 =
Kt+1
gk,t
, vt = Vt, yt =
Yt
gt
And exploiting the recursive structure we can reformulate it as a dynamic program
J(s) = max
k,n′,v
{
ζatk
θ
t tt
(1−θ) −wtntlt − rtktxt−1 − avt + βE
[
λt+1
λt+1
J(s′)
]}
subject to
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nt+1 = (1− σt)nt + qtvt
ln at+1 = ρa ln at + (1− ρa) lna+ ε
a
t+1
lnσt+1 = ρσ lnσt + (1− ρσ) lnσ + ε
σ
t+1
where µ is the multiplier associated with the constraint above.
Therefore, the first order conditions, assuming interior solution, can be expressed as follows:
• w.r.t. capital (k)
Fk = θ
yt
kt
= rtxt−1
• w.r.t. vacancies (v)
−a+ µtqt = 0
• w.r.t. employment (n′)
βE [Wn(st+1)]− µt = 0
• constraint () holding with equality
nt+1 = (1− σ)nt + qtvt
From the envelope theorem, one derives
Wn(st) = Fnlt −wtlt + µt [1− σt]
Therefore the optimal decision for the firms are specified by:
Fk = θ
yt
kt
= rtxt−1
avt
mt
= βE
[
λt
λt+1
(
(1− θ)
yt
tt
lt −wtlt +
avt+1
mt+1
[1− σt+1]
)]
nt+1 = (1− σt)nt + qtvt
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2.A.3 Matching
The number of matches per unit of time is given by the following technology
mt = χv
α
t (etut)
(1−α)
2.A.4 Nash-bargaining
The income value of employment for a household and a firm can be represented as follows:
Jn,t = F2lt −wtlt + βE
[
λt+1
λt
Jn,t+1
]
(1− σt)
Wn,t = φ1
(1− lt)
(1−η)
1− η
− φ2
(1− e)(1−η)
1− η
+ λtwtlt + βE [Wn,t+1] (1− σt − φt)
Optimal contracts are obtained through Nash bargaining as
wtlt = argmaxW
pJ(1−p)
Therefore the optimal contract is given by the following equation:
wtlt = p
(
F2lt + a
vt
ut
)
− (1− p)
(
φ1
λt
(1− lt)
(1−η)
1− η
−
φ2
λt
(1− e)(1−η)
1− η
)
The optimal number of hours per worked is obtained as the partial derivative of the surplus
of the match with respect to hours worked
∂St
∂lt
= F2 −
φ1
λt
(1− lt)
−η = 0
where F2 = (1− θ)
yt
ntlt
2.A.5 Non-stochastic equilibrium
The unknown policy functions for {kt, lt, vt, ct, it, yt, nt,mt, wt} are characterized by the following
system of equations:
γzγx
θ
1−θ = βE
{
ct
ct+1
dt+1
dt
[
(1− δ) γx,t+1
−1 + θ
yt+1
kt+1
]}
φ1(1− lt)
(−η) =
dt
ct
(1− θ)
yt
ntlt
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avt
mt
= βE
{
ct
ct+1
dt+1
dt
[
(1− θ)
yt+1
nt+1
−wtlt +
avt+1
mt+1
(1− σt+1)
]}
ct + it + κvt = yt
γzγx,t
θ
1−θ kt+1 = (1− δ)ktγx,t
−1 + it
yt = ζatk
θ
t tt
1−θ
nt+1 = (1− σt)nt +mt
mt = χv
α
t (etut)
(1−α)
wtlt = p
(
F2lt + a
vt
ut
)
− (1− p)
(
φ1
λt
(1− lt)
(1−η)
1− η
−
φ2
λt
(1− e)(1−η)
1− η
)
ln at+1 = ρa ln at + (1− ρa) lna+ ε
a
t+1
lnσt+1 = ρσ lnσt + (1− ρσ) lnσ + ε
σ
t+1
lndt+1 = ρd ln dt + (1− ρd) ln d+ ε
d
t+1
lnγx,t+1 = ρx ln γx,t + (1− ρx) ln γx + ε
x
t+1
2.A.6 Log-linearized model
The deterministic equations are
0 = y(t)− n(t)− l(t) + d(t)− c(t) + ηf(t)
0 = cc(t) + ii(t) + κvv(t)− yy(t)
0 = γzγx
θ
1−θ k
[
θ
1− θ
γx(t) + k(t+ 1)
]
− (1− δ)kγx
−1(k(t)− γx(t))− ii(t)
yt = ζ (ktgt)
−1θ (ntlt)
(1−θ)
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0 = y(t)− θk(t) + θg(t)− (1− θ)(n(t) + l(t))
0 = nn(t+ 1)− (1− σ)nn(t) +mm(t)
0 = m(t)− αv(t)− (1− α)u(t)
0 = we (w(t) + l(t))− p(1− θ)
y
n
(y(t)− n(t))− pa
v
u
(v(t)− u(t)) +
(1− p)φ1
c
d
f
(1−η)
1− η
(c(t)− d(t) + (1− η)f(t))− (1− p)φ2
c
d
(1− e)(1−η)
1− η
(c(t)− d(t))
and the expectational equations:
0 = E
 γzγx θ1−θβ (c(t)− c(t+ 1) + d(t+ 1)− d(t+ 1))
−(1− δ)γx
−1γx(t+ 1) + θ
y
k
(y(t+ 1)− k(t− 1))
− γzγx θ1−θ
β
θ
1− θ
γx(t)
0 = E
 1β avm (c(t)− c(t+ 1) + d(t+ 1)− d(t+ 1)) + (1− θ)
y
n (y(t+ 1)− n(t+ 1))
−wl (w(t+ 1) + l(t+ 1)) + avm (1− σ) (v(t+ 1)−m(t+ 1))−
av
mσσ(t+ 1)
− 1β avm (v(t)−m(t))
2.B Appendix: Macro-data
The macro-data used in this study is real aggregate data of the United States for the period
1964:Q1-2005:Q4. The source is the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.
• Consumption: (real consumption of non durables + real consumption of services + govern-
ment expenditures)/(population +16)
• Investment = (real consumption of durable goods+ real fixed private investment)/(population
+16)
• output = consumption + investment + vacancies*cost per vacancy
• vacancies = help wanted advertising in newspapers / (population+16)
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• employment = (civilian employment +16) / (population+16)
• unemployment = 1 - employment
• tightness = vacancies/unemployment
• total hours = employment*average weekly hours / (population+16)
• labor productivity = output / total hours
2.C Impulse-response functions
Impulse responses to neutral technology shocks
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Impulse responses to shocks to job separations
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Impulse responses to preference shock
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Impulse responses to investment-specific technology shocks
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2.D Variance decomposition
TABLE 3: VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS
Percentage due Percentage due Percentage due Percentage due
Quarters ahead to technology to job destruction to preference to Invst-spcf.
(A) Output
1 94.7719
(0.0031)
0.0062
(0.0001)
0.7634
(0.0031)
4.4514
(0.0001)
4 81.5334
(0.0032)
0.1048
(0.0001)
1.5592
(0.0031)
16.8012
(0.0002)
8 72.6304
(0.0031)
0.1601
(0.0002)
1.5618
(0.0028)
25.6466
(0.0002)
20 61.5615
(0.0027)
0.1704
(0.0003)
1.2211
(0.0024)
37.0465
(0.0004)
∞ 57.5115
(0.0027)
0.1641
(0.0003)
1.0989
(0.0022)
41.2251
(0.0005)
(B) Consumption
1 8.2348
(0.0251)
0.0754
(0.0001)
37.8825
(0.0258)
53.7989
(0.0009)
4 22.6212
(0.0337)
0.1605
(0.0001)
45.1705
(0.0340)
32.0441
(0.0003)
8 23.4532
(0.0340)
0.1522
(0.0001)
22.3989
(0.0344)
53.9943
(0.0006)
20 14.5434
(0.0244)
0.0912
(0.0002)
5.4398
(0.0244)
79.9253
(0.0018)
∞ 12.2991
(0.0205)
0.0769
(0.0002)
3.4240
(0.0200)
83.8704
(0.0024)
(C) Investment
1 48.8137
(0.0078)
0.0032
(0.0001)
12.3811
(0.0076)
38.8014
(0.0006)
4 58.5699
(0.0051)
0.1496
(0.0001)
6.5485
(0.0049)
34.7319
(0.0004)
8 65.4239
(0.0044)
0.2642
(0.0003)
5.3245
(0.0041)
28.9873
(0.0003)
20 59.2955
(0.0042)
0.2707
(0.0003)
4.3548
(0.0039)
36.0789
(0.0003)
∞ 48.3641
(0.0042)
0.2210
(0.0003)
3.5449
(0.0038)
47.8698
(0.0005)
(D) Total Hours
1 2.8348
(0.0222)
0.0010
(0.0001)
1.3383
(0.0221)
1.8957
(0.0007)
4 8.9659
(0.0224)
0.0604
(0.0008)
2.7896
(0.0223)
2.3073
(0.0003)
8 22.0435
(0.0241)
0.1319
(0.0013)
3.4541
(0.0240)
5.5941
(0.0002)
20 52.6153
(0.0266)
0.1508
(0.0015)
3.6112
(0.0267)
15.4644
(0.0005)
∞ 64.2666
(0.0266)
0.1325
(0.0014)
3.2774
(0.0267)
26.5599
(0.0008)
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TABLE 3: VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS (Con’t.)
Percentage due Percentage due Percentage due Percentage due
Quarters ahead to technology to job destruction to preference to Invst-spcf.
(E) Tightness
1 47.4503
(0.0121)
18.2118
(0.0120)
2.9180
(0.0003)
18.2564
(0.0000)
4 50.4378
(0.0122)
24.0603
(0.0121)
6.2366
(0.0003)
12.2850
(0.0000)
8 39.1042
(0.0124)
22.7985
(0.0121)
7.2138
(0.0006)
25.9582
(0.0000)
20 18.8518
(0.0125)
13.0137
(0.0123)
4.5369
(0.0008)
43.3472
(0.0000)
∞ 14.9616
(0.0126)
9.9506
(0.0123)
3.4933
(0.0008)
61.2816
(0.0000)
56 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chapter 3
A RBC model with unemployed loss
of skills
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58 CHAPTER 3. A RBC MODEL WITH UNEMPLOYED LOSS OF SKILLS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a real business cycle model with matching in the labor market and
two types of workers, high-skilled and low-skilled, in which high-skilled workers might suffer from
a decapitalization of their human capital while unemployed.
Related to the determinants of the persistence in unemployment, Pissarides (1992) proposes
an overlapping generation model to show that when unemployed workers lose some of their skills,
the effects of a negative temporary shock to employment can persist for a long time. The key
mechanism that drives the result is a variant of the "thin market externality" that reduces the
demand of jobs when duration of unemployment increases. A similar underlying idea we find in
Blanchard and Diamond (1994) who study the relationship between "ranking" -or the preference
of employers for short-term unemployed workers- wages and unemployment. The hypothesis of
loss of skills during unemployment has also been used in the literature to explain the differences
between unemployment rates in Europe and US. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) is the first paper
that introduces this "turbulence" shock in the literature.
We propose a model that emcompasses the Pissarides and Ljungqvist-Sargent models of skill
loss. Given that none of the papers above study the cyclical behavior of unemployment and
other macro-variables, it seems sensible, once we have understood which are the key problems of
labor markets nowadays (i.e. the steadily increase of unemployment since the late 70s and the
large fraction of long-term unemployed), to try to embed them into a standard real business cycle
model so as to construct a suitable framework for policy making.
Our starting point would be the seminal papers that introduce frictional labor markets into
a RBC framework (Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996)). These two papers outperform previous
studies in terms of explaining the performance of the macroeconomic variables along the business
cycle. However, as Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) pointed out, there is still room for improvement,
mainly in terms of volatility and persistence of vacancies and unemployment, and therefore of the
labor market tightness. Shimer suggests that this deficiency could be overcome by introducing
sticky wages. We will analyze, as well, how the assumption introduced in this model, i.e., the loss
of skills, can contribute or not to better understand the propagation mechanism of unemployment,
and consecutively, of labor market tightness.
We estimate via maximum likelihood the structural parameters of the model using key macro-
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economic time series for the US economy. We find sensible values for the structural parameters
of the model and an improvement in the performance of the model in terms of volatilities of the
main variables of the model with respect to a more standard specification in which unemployed
workers do not suffer from this loss of skills. On the contrary, although not surprisingly, unem-
ployment shows larger persistence in the model than in the data. Finally, our model allows us
to test whether there is empirical evidence in favor of an increase in "turbulence" as proposed
by Ljunqvist and Sargent. We do not find strong evidence in favor of an increase in turbulence
shock for the US.
The structure of the paper is the following: in Section 2, we present the theoretical model.
Section 3 estimates the structural parameters of the model . Section 4 evaluates the model by
analyzing the second-order moments both in the model and in the data. Section 5 analyzes the
stability of the parameters of the model and relates the result with the literature that explains
the rise of unemployment in the European labor markets. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The model
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents with measure one. Workers are
assumed to be either high-skilled, h, or low-skilled, l. High skilled workers who have just lost their
jobs retain their skill for a certain period of time. The loss of skill occurs over time and is modelled
as a random process following a Poisson distribution with parameter γ. i.e. with probability γ
a high-skilled unemployed worker is going to suffer a depreciation of his human capital and be
transformed into a low-skilled unemployed. On the other hand, there is a probability η that a
low skilled employed worker upgrades his human capital and become a high-skilled worker.
Both types of workers can exogenously lose their jobs with probabilities σh for the high
skilled and σl for the low-skilled. The probabilities of leaving unemployment or equivalently, the
probabilities of finding a job are φh for the high-skilled and φl for the low-skilled.
Unemployed workers receive an unemployment insurance when losing their jobs which is a
fraction, ψ of the wage they had while working. In this way we have three types of unem-
ployed workers: Uh, which represent the pool of unemployed workers with high skills and high
unemployment benefit, Ut, which represent the pool of unemployed workers who have suffered
a depreciation of their human capital but still receive high unemployment benefits and Ub, that
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represents the pool of unemployed workers with low skills and low unemployment benefits.
When looking for a job, we pool the low-skilled searchers with low and high unemployment
benefits, and create a group Ul = Ut + Ub, so that firms opening vacancies for workers with
low-skills face the supply Ul.
Therefore, our model can be summarized through the flows represented in the next figure,
where Eh and El represent the pool of employed workers with high and low skills, respectively.
Figure 1: Flows of workers
Firms and Technology - The production sector is made up of a large number of identical
competitive firms. The production technology is represented by a constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function. Therefore, there exists a representative firm which uses capital, Kt,
and labor, Tt, to produce the aggregate good, Yt, according to the following technology
Yt= ξAtK
θ
t (ℓ
tTt)
1−θ
where ℓ > 1 measures the gross rate of labor-augmenting technological progress. The fact that
we have a deterministic growth rate, would make necessary to detrend the variables in such a
way that in equilibrium the economy would converge to a steady state in which the detrended
variables of the model would remain constant. We define the detrended variables, which will
be represented in small letters, as: yt= Y t/ℓ
t, kt= Kt//ℓ
t, tt= T t, at= At, uj,t= U j,t, nj,t= N j,t,
hj,t= Hj,t , wj,t= ℓ
twj,t/ℓ
t, v
j,t
= V j,t, aj,t= ℓ
taj,t/ℓ
t, mj,t=M j,t , ij,t= Ij,t/ℓ
t. In what follows we
will work with the stationary model. This means that the production function above can be
stated as:
yt= ξatk
θ
t (tt)
1−θ
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The TFP shock at follows a first order autorregresive process
ln (at) = ρ ln (at−1) + (1− ρ) ln (a) + ε
a
t
where a > 0 represents the steady state value, and −1 < ρ < 1. The serially uncorrelated
innovation εat is assumed to be normally and independently distributed over time with mean 0
and variance σε.
The firm hires capital, kt, and labor, tt and opens vacancies for high and low-skilled workers,
vh and vl, to maximize the expected present value of cash flows,
∞∑
t=0
∆t [F (at, kt, tt)−wh,tnh,thh,t −wl,tnl,thl,t − rtkt − a(vs + vl)]
subject to the laws of motion of employment (1) and (2) specified below. a denotes de cost of
opening a vacant vj , with j = h, l and ∆
t is the discount factor for the firm, with ∆t = βUc(s
′)
Uc(s) .
The amount of labor included in the production function is defined in efficiency units as follows
tt = nh,thh,t + τnl,thl,t
where nj,t denotes the number of workers of type j in period t and hj,t denotes the number of
hours worked by each type of worker. τ < 1.
Since the labor market is frictional, the laws of motion for the two types of workers (high and
low skill) are defined as:
nh,t+1 = nh,t(1− σs) + qh,tvh,t + ηnl,t (3.1)
nl,t+1 = nl,t(1− σl) + ql,tvl,t − ηnl,t (3.2)
where qj,t represents the perceived probability that a vacancy of type j gets matched with an
unemployed worker of the same type. ηnl,t represents the fraction of low-skilled unemployed
workers that suffer an upgrade of skills every period. Thus, upgrading follows a Poisson process
with η rate which is independent of other processes in the model.
The labor market - The labor market is modellized as a frictional market in which firms
and workers engage in employment relationships. The total number of matches per unit of time
is represented by the following technology
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mj,t = m(vj,t , uj,t)
where uj,t represents the total number of type j searchers and vj,t the total number of vacancies
of type j. This matching function is increasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of
degree one.
The job vacancies and the unemployed workers that are matched at any point in time t, are
randomly selected from the sets v and u. Therefore, the process that changes the state of vacant
jobs to filled vacant is a Poisson with rate qj,t=
mj,t
vj,t
. Similarly, unemployed workers move into
employment with probability φj,t=
mj,t
uj,t
.
The empirical literature has further found that a log-linear Cobb-Douglas approximation of
the matching function fits the data well1. So, in our model, the total number of matches at time
t is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function in the total number of searchers and vacancies
of type j.
mj,t = χjv
αj
j,tu
1−αj
j,t
where χj is called the "efficiency parameter" of the matching function. Under the Cobb-Douglas
specification above, the probability of finding a job, φj increases with the tightness ratio (
v
u) with
elasticity 1− αj < 1.
Households and Preferences - The economy is populated by identical, infinitely-lived
households. In each household there are high and low skilled workers. The measure of type j
workers is denoted by ej, for j = h, l and the total measure of workers is normalize to one. We
assume a complete set of insurance markets such that the worker’s saving choices do not depend
on its state on the labor market. Thus there is a representative household that solves the following
problem:
Max E
{
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, ht)
}
(3.3)
where ct denotes consumption and ht denotes time spent at the work place. The specification of
the utility function adopted in our model is the following:
1 see Pissarides (1990), ch.1 and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey.
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U(ct, ht) = log (ct) + nh,tΓ
nh
t +nl,tΓ
nl
t +uh,tΓ
uh
t +ul,tΓ
nl
t
where Γ
nj
t = φ1j
(1−hi,t)
1−ηu
1−ηu and Γ
uj
t = φ2j
(1−et)1−η
u
1−ηu . This function, is the one used in Andolfatto
(1996). Although is not the standard specification in RBC models, it would allow us to analyze
straightforward the implications of introducing the assumption of loss of skills during unemploy-
ment with respect to this "reference model"
The household has to decide how to split current income between consumption and investment.
Its income is made up of capital income, unemployment benefits and the wage bill net of the
lump sum, Ψt, they have to pay to the government to finance the unemployment insurances, bj,t.
Therefore, the household’s budget constraint in period t is
ct+it+Ψt ≤ wh,tnh,thh,t+wl,tnl,thl,t+uh,tbh,t+ul,tbl,t+rtkt+pt
and investment is defined as follows:
it= ℓkt+1−(1− δ)kt
The dynamics of unemployment of the high skilled and the low skilled workers are given as:
uh,t+1 = uh,t −mh,t + σhnh,t − γuh,t
ul,t+1 = ul,t −ml,t + σlnl,t + γuh,t
where uj,t denotes the measure of type j searchers, σj is the exogenous rate of job destruc-
tion and φj is the perceived probability that an unemployed worker be matched in period t.
γuh,t represents the fraction of workers that suffer from a loss of skill while unemployed. As we
said, this process follows a Poisson distribution with parameter γ. Since we have normalized the
measure of the population to one, this means that every period a fraction γ of the high skilled
workers suffers a "decapitalization" of their human capital while becoming long term unemployed.
Optimal contract - Following the standard literature on frictional unemployment, we assume
that wages are the solution to a Nash-bargaining problem. Hence, if we denote as pj the worker’s
bargaining power, the optimal contract is given by
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wj,thj,t=argmax
{
W pnj,tJ
(1−p)
nj,t
}
, for j = h, l
where Wnj ,t and Jnj ,t represent the income value of employment of type j to the household and
the firm respectively. pj will be treated as a constant parameter moving strictly between 0 and
1.
The income value of high-skilled employment to the household in units of the consumption
good is given by:
Wnh(Ω
H
t ) =
 (Γ
nh−Γuh) + λtwh,tnh,thh,t − λtuh,tbh,t+
+βEt
[
Wnh(Ω
H
t+1)
]
(1− φh − σh − γ) + γβE
[
Wnl(Ω
H
t+1)
]

and is made up of three components: (i) the household gain in terms of wages because an addi-
tional high-skilled agent starts working (ii) the utility losses in terms of leisure that this new job
generates and (iii) the expected present value of this job in the future. This expected present
value is formed by the continuation value of the job, that is the net probability of keeping a
high-skilled employment, minus the probability γ that the high-skilled worker suffer from a de-
preciation of his human capital and become a low-skilled worker
The minimum wage the worker is going to accept comes from Wnh(Ω
H
t ) = 0. Notice that the
high skilled worker takes into account the possibility of becoming long term unemployed and with
probability γ losing some of his skills, therefore he is willing to accept a lower wage than in the
standard case in which γ = 0.
Similarly, the firm’s marginal benefit from employment is made up of the job’s yields, i.e., the
contribution to output of this marginal worker minus the returns to his work, plus the expected
present value of this job in the future.
Jnh(Ω
F
t ) = Fnh,t−wh,thh,t+βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Jns(Ω
F
t+1)
]
(1− σh)
For low-skilled workers, the household’s marginal value of low skilled employment is given by the
equation below, which includes the net gain in utility for an additional low skilled worker plus
the expected present value of this job in the future.
Wnl(Ω
H
t ) = (Γ
n−Γu) + λtwl,thl,t−λtul,tbl,t+βEt
[
Wnl(Ω
H
t+1)
]
(1− φl,t−σl)
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The firms’ marginal value of low skilled employment equals the job’s yields plus the expected
present value of this position in the future.
Jnl(Ω
F
t ) = Fnl,t−wl,thl,t+βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Jnl(Ω
F
t+1)
]
(1− σl)
+ηβEt
{
λt+1
λt
[
Jns(Ω
F
t+1)− Jnl(Ω
F
t+1)
]}
notice that this expected present value includes the probability η of transforming the low quality
match into a high quality one. Jnh(Ω
F
t ) = 0, gives the maximum compensation that the employer
is willing to pay2.
From the first order condition of this maximization problem, we get the optimal contract for
each type of worker in this economy is given by the reservation wage and a fraction p of the net
surplus they create by accepting the job offer. Net surplus means the product value net of what
workers give up in terms of leisure and reservation wage. These optimal contracts can expressed
as follows:
wh,thh,t = phFnh,t+phah
vh,t
uh,t
+phγ
(
ah
qh,t
−
al
ql,t
)
+(1− ph)bh,t
−(1− ph)ct
(
φ1,h
(1− hh,t)
(1−ηh)
(1− ηh)
− φ2,h
(1− e)(1−ηh)
(1− ηh)
)
The reservation wage of a high-skilled worker is given by the unemployment insurance plus the
leisure in terms of utility enjoyed by the potential worker. The net surplus is given by the
contribution of the worker to the output, which is his marginal productivity plus the savings in
terms of posting vacancies cost and the opportunity cost for the firm of not hiring the high skilled
worker given that with probability γ he can suffer a depreciation of skills net of what the worker
gives up which is his reservation wage.
Similarly, the optimal contract for the low-skilled worker is given by the following equation:
wl,thl,t = plFnl,t+plal
vl,t
ul,t
+plη
(
ah
qh,t
−
al
ql,t
)
+(1− pl)bl,t
−(1− pl)ct
(
φ1,l
(1− hl,t)
(1−ηl)
(1− ηl)
− φ2,h
(1− e)(1−ηh)
(1− ηh)
)
2Note that if the firm offers this maximum compensation to the worker, it would generate negative profits in
the steady state, because it does not take into account the fact that posting vacancies is a costly activity.
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The only difference with respect to the optimal contract for the other type of workers is that now,
the firm takes into account that when it hires a low-skilled worker he can become high-skilled
type with probability η.
To disentangle wages and hours worked we need two additional equations. We can compute
the optimal number of hours for each type of worker differentiating the total surplus of each type
of match Sj,t=
1
λt
Wnj ,t+Jnj ,t with respect to the hours
∂Sj,t
∂hj,t
, so that the optimal number of hours
worked for each type of worker can be represented as:
φ1
1
λt
(1− hj,t)
(−ηj)= (1− θ)
yt
lt
with j = h, l.
Definition of the recursive equilibrium - We can define the equilibrium of this economy
as a set of infinite sequences for the rental price of capital {rt}, wage rates {wh,t, wl,t}, employ-
ment and unemployment levels {nh,t, nl,t, uh,t, ul,t}, capital {kt}, consumption {ct}, vacancies
{vh,t, vl,t}, hazard rates for workers {φh,t, φl,t} and vacancies {qs,t, ql,t}, such that,
(i) Taking the rental prices and matching rates as given, {kt}, {nh,t, nl,t} and {vh,t, vl,t}
maximize the firms’ profits
(ii) Wages are the solution to the Nash bargaining problem
(iii) Taking wages, the rental price of capital and hazard rates, {ct} and {kt} solves the
household optimization problem
(iv) Hazard rates are given by the matching function
(v) The government constraint holds
3.3 Estimation of the model
The model presented above has a large number of parameters. This rises the problem of assigning
values to all of them. Standard calibration does not seem the best technique when models are
richly parameterized given that neither the focus on a limited set of moments of the model nor
the transfer of microeconomics estimates from one model to another will provide the discipline
to quantify the behavior of the model; so we have to rely in alternative methods that allow us
to properly estimate the parameters of the model. We will estimate the parameters of our model
via Maximum Likelihood.
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Maximum Likelihood provides a systematic procedure to give values to all the parameters
of interest. This means that we have to evaluate the likelihood function of our DSGE model.
Except in a few cases, there is no analytical or numerical procedure to directly do it. But we can
transform the theoretical model into a state-space econometric model and under the assumptions
that the shocks to the economy are normally distributed and that the policy functions of the
model are linearly approximated, we can look for a numerical approximation of the likelihood
function with the help of the Kalman filter. In what follows we explain this in more detail.
State-space representation of the model - Appendix A describes the competitive solution
to the model above, so that when εat = 0, the economy converges to a steady state in which
each of the detrended variables remain constant. This steady state, depends on the structural
parameters of the model describing tastes, technologies and matching. Appendix B contains the
log-linearizations around the steady state from which we will implement the method proposed by
Uhlig (1997) that when applied to a linear system yields the approximate solution or policy rules
of the form:
xt= Axt−1+Bεt
yt= Cxt
where xt and yt represent vectors of logarithmic deviations of the states and the control variables
from their steady-state levels. The elements of the matrices A, B and C depend on some of the
model structural parameters.
The solution above considers that there is only one shock, the technology shock, driving the
business cycle. This makes the model stochastically singular, i.e., the model predicts that certain
combinations of the endogenous variables will hold with equality, and if in the data these exact
relationships do not hold, maximum likelihood estimation will not be a valid method for the
estimation.
Therefore, we should do any transformation in the model that allow us to overcome this
problem. As Ireland (2004) explains, there are two common approaches to face the stochastic
singularity problem. The first one consists in increasing the number of shocks in the model until
we have the same number of shocks as number of time series used in the estimation; whereas
the second approach first proposed by Altug (1989), which is the one we use here, consists
in augmenting last equation of the system above with an error term or measurement error,
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met. These errors represent the movements in the data that the theory does not explain (those
movements that are not generated by the TFP shock, in our case) and are uncorrelated across
variables. Then we have a system of the form:
st= Fst−1+V εt
ft= Gst+met
where ft denotes a vector of variables observed at date t, and st is the state vector, F and G are
again matrices of parameters. The first equation of the system is known as the state equation
and the second is known as the observation equation. Vectors εt and met are white noise vectors
with E[εtε
′
t] = Q and E[metme
′
t] = R. Also E[εtme
′
t] = 0
Thus, once we have included this measurement errors, our theoretical DSGE model takes the
form of a state-space econometric model whose parameters can now be estimated via maximum
likelihood.
Kalman filter and approximation of the likelihood function - The empirical model
written as a state-space econometric model, allows for the evaluation of the likelihood function
using the Kalman filter algorithm explained in detail in Hamilton (1994, Chapter 13).
The ultimate objective is to estimate the values of the unknown parameters in the system
on the basis of these observations f1, f2, ..., fT . The Kalman filter works as a recursive estimator
that takes initial values for the state-vector ŝt|t−1 and its associate mean squared error Pt|t−1, to
calculate linear least square forecast of the state-vector for subsequent periods t=2,3,...T. This
forecasts are of the form. ŝt|t−1=Ê[st+1| f t], where Ê[st+1| f t] is the linear projection of st+1 on
ft and a constant. The Kalman filter has two main phases: prediction and update.
In the prediction phase, using the law of iterated projections, it plugs the forecast ŝt|t−1 into
the observable equation to yield a forecasting of ft
f̂t|t−1= Gŝt|t−1
the error of this forecast is defined as wt= f t−f̂t|t−1 = Gst+met−Gŝt|t−1−met with MSE
E[(f t−f̂t|t−1)(f t−f̂t|t−1)′] = FP t|t−1F
′+R.
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In the second phase, the inference about the current value of st is updated on the basis of
the observation of ft to produce ŝt|t.. Introducing it into the state equation produces a forecast
of ŝt+1|t
ŝt+1|t = Fŝt|t + 0
evaluating ŝt|t by using the formula of updating a linear projection, and substituting it above, we
get the best forecast of st+1 based on a constant and a linear function of the observable vector ft
ŝt+1|t = Fŝt|t−1 +Kt(ft − f̂t|t−1)
where Kt is the optimal Kalman gain matrix, which depends on the matrices F, G, R and the
stationary variance Σt. Those matrices are not function of the data but entirely determined by
the population parameters of the process. ŝt+1|t denotes the best forecast of st+1 based on a
constant and a linear function of the observables ft if and only if Kt is the optimal gain matrix.
The application of the Kalman filter let us calculate the log-likelihood function of the hybrid
model as
ln(L) = −
3T
2
ln (2π)−
1
2
T∑
t=1
ln
∣∣GΣtG′∣∣−1
2
T∑
t=1
w′t
(
GΣtG
′
)−1
wt
Using a numerical search algorithm one can find the set of parameters contained in the matrices
F, G, Q and R that maximize the likelihood function. Usually, maximum likelihood estimations
of this type are criticized because it is very difficult to be sure whether we are in the global
maximum or on the contrary we are just in a local one, given that the likelihood function displays
a quite sinuous pattern. To avoid this criticism with our estimations we borrow from physics
another algorithm called "simulated annealing". This is a generic probabilistic meta-algorithm
for the global optimization problem, i.e. it looks for a good approximation to the global optimum
of a function in a large search space. Each step of the simulated annealing algorithm replaces the
current solution by a random "nearby" solution. The allowance for these movements saves the
method from becoming stuck at a local minimum.
In principle, this numerical algorithm is allowed to select values of the parameters that lie
anywhere between the positive and the negative infinity. But to ensure that our parameters
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satisfy the theoretical restrictions listed in section 2, additional constraints have been imposed3.
The data - Data is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database. Data
for gross domestic income and wages is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In Appendix
C, we present detailed information about each series. Monthly data has been transformed into
quarterly data using averages. The period selected goes from 1964-1 to 2005-4.
When the model takes the form of a state-space representation, it can be estimated via
maximum likelihood once analogs to the model’s variables are found in the data. Therefore, Ct is
defined as real personal consumption on non durables and services plus government expenditure.
Investment, It is defined as the sum of consumption on durable goods plus investment. Vacancies,
Vt are proxied by a widely used index which reflects the number of "help-wanted" advertisement
registered in US newspapers. Nt comes directly from the number of civilian employment, and thus
unemployment can be computed as 1−N t. Unemployment duration, Dt ,also comes directly from
the median duration of unemployment series.
All the variables have been divided by the civilian population aged 16 or over, so as to have
them in per capita terms. On top of that we have taken logarithms of all the variables and
calculated the growth rates when necessary. Series have not been filtered in any other way.
Finally, to make them comparable with the vectors of logarithmic deviations of the variables
from their steady-state levels, we have to use the definitions:
ĉt = log(ct)− log(c)
ît = log(it)− log(i)
P̂rt = log(Pr t)− log(Pr)− t log(γ)
t̂t = log(tt)− log(t)
θ̂t = log(θt)− log(θ)
d̂t = log(dt)− log(d)
for all t = 1....T . Remember that to solve the problem we have normalized output to 1. Therefore,
consumption and investment here are defined as ĉt =
(̂
cd,t
yt
)
. and ît =
(̂
id,t
yt
)
. Productivity is
3 In particular, some of our parameters are constrained to be positive, so we constraint the algorithm to work
with absolute values. Many of our parameters are probabilities that should lie between zero and one, so we again
constraint the algorithm to work with the logistic transformation of the parameter.
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growing at rate ℓ in steady state. Once those transformations are made, the vector of observable
is given by:
ft=
[
ĉt ît t̂t P̂ dt θ̂t d̂urt
]
Parameter estimates - Usually algorithms for computing maximum likelihood estimates
have the drawback that they do not produce standard errors. This means that we should look
for numerical approximations of the derivatives of the likelihood function so as to compute the
information matrix and then the standard errors.
Fortunately, we know that if certain regularity conditions hold4, the maximum likelihood
estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal. Under these circumstances, the information
matrix for a sample of size T can be calculated from the second derivatives of the maximized
log-likelihood function as
IT= −
1
T
{
T∑
t=1
∂2 logL(yt, θ)
∂θ ∂θ′
}
(3.4)
Standard errors are then the square roots of the diagonal elements of 1T (IT )
−1. This matrix
has elements of very different magnitudes and therefore, the reported standard errors should be
interpreted with caution.
Results of the estimation - In the next table we report the maximum likelihood estimations
for the parameters and their standard errors. The values of the parameters estimated constitute
all of them sensible results.
It is quite common to obtain low estimates for the discount factor β, showing the preference
of the household for consumption today. What we have done is to estimate the parameters of the
model keeping β fixed and equal to 0.99.
The first thing worth noting is the slow upgrade of skills. This result is in line with the
assumption made by the turbulence hypothesis presented in Ljungqvist and Sargent’s series of
4These conditions include that the model must be identified, the eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle, the
true values of the estimations do not fall on a boundary of the allowable parameter space and that variables xt
behave asymptotically like a full-rank linearly indeterministic covariance-stationary process
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papers and has been widely challenged by Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2001 and 2005) in
different papers because what they think is a too low value for upgrading of skills. What we see
is that the data does not give support to this criticism and supports the value proposed by LS.
Data does not fulfill the efficiency condition or Hosios condition which states that the bargain-
ing power or the workers pj should equal the parameter (1− αj) of the matching function so as
to have efficient results. As we can see from our estimations, there is no evidence in favor of this
condition neither in support of Hagedorn and Manovskii’s proposal. Another important difference
with respect to the values proposed by Andolfatto (1996) are those related to the job separation
rates, σi, which adopt values around 0.08 instead of the 0.15. Nevertheless, the 0.15 proposed by
Andolfatto (1996) is somehow higher to what is common in the literature that corresponds to a
value of 0.05.
Table 2: Estimated parameters and standard deviations
Parameter Value Explanation Std. error
αh 0.8001 elasticity vacancies type h 0.0010
αl 0.8012 elasticity vacancies type l 0.0021
η 0.0186 upgrade of skills 0.0040
ρ 0.9492 technology persistence 0.0119
ε 0.0098 volatility 0.0001
ph 0.1067 bargaining power workers 0.0009
pl 0.3552 bargaining power workers 0.0007
γ 1.0057 deterministic growth rate 0.0001
θ 0.583 elasticity of capital 0.0027
δ 0.033 depreciation of capital 0.0059
τ 0.901 efficiency units of low product workers 0.0124
σh 0.0781 exog. destruc rate for h 0.0027
σl 0.0897 exog. destruc rate for l 0.0020
ηu 3.3341 parameter utility function 0.0009
The persistence of the technology shock adopts a sensible value, close to the standard value
of 0.95. A bit higher is the volatility εa which usually adopts a value of 0.007 but here that is
almost 0.01.
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Finally and in spite of the fact that standard errors have had to be approximated numerically,
the take very small values making significant all the values of our estimation.
The deterministic growth rate of the economy takes a value close to one. This means that
we could have worked with a stationary model. The least satisfactory results are those values
driving the investment and capital accumulation of the economy. We obtain a value of θ close to
0.6 whereas the standard value in the literature is close to 0.4. Also the depreciation of capital,
δ, takes a higher value than what is standard. This has led us to estimate a second version of
the model, in which we have constrained the values of those parameters to take these standard
values. The performance of variables such as consumption and investment improves with this
new specification as we will see afterwards.
The remainder parameters of the model can be obtained through the estimations above and
the steady state values of the variables. Table 3 describes those parameter, which again seem to
be quite reasonable
Table 3: Parameters that can be obtained through the estimations
Parameter Value Explanation
γ 0.0265 prob. of downgrade of skills
χh 0.8499 efficiency paramet. matching function
χl 0.8526 efficiency paramet matching function
ξ 0.5585 parameter production function
a 0.1856 cost of posting a vacancy
φ1,h 1.4260 parameter in the utility function
φ1,l 0.7130 parameter in the utility function
φ2,h 2.9669 parameter in the utility function
φ2,h 0.8157 parameter in the utility function
The important parameter above is mainly the probability for high-skilled workers from suf-
fering from a depreciation of skills, which takes a value of 0.0265, very close to the Ljunqvist and
Sargent’s value. The remainder parameters take sensible values.
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3.4 Dynamic implications
This section is divided in two parts. In the first one we present the quantitative properties of our
model whereas in the second we analyze the contribution of our model to the literature that tries
to explain the rise in European unemployment and its persistence over time.
3.4.1 Evaluation of the model
Table 4 presents the volatilities of the main variables of the model and compares them with the
values for the US economy and the Andolfatto (1996) model. We have two columns of results:
DSGE(1) and DSGE (2). The first one corresponds to the values of the parameters presented in
Table 2 above whereas DSGE(2) represents the more constrained model in which we have fixed
the values of β, θ and δ fixed.
What we can see from these values is that the volatility of total hours worked, employment,
hours per worker and tightness increase substantially with respect to the Andolfatto model. Our
model increases also the volatility of both unemployment and vacancies with respect to the search
economy or the Andolfatto results. We can see this as a success given the large literature dealing
with it nowadays.
The model has some difficulty in explaining the volatility of the variable hours per worker,
which results substantially larger in the model than in the data. Accordingly, the volatilities of
the wage bill and the labor share of output also result more volatile than in the data. This result
depends up to some extent on the parameter ηu of the utility function and the replacement ratio
used to compute the unemployment benefit. Probably, a more standard specification of the utility
function could yield more satisfactory results concerning the performance of this variable or even
allowing for this parameter to take larger values can partially solve the problem.
The DSGE(2) yields overall better results in terms of volatilities than DSGE(1). We do not
see any inconvenient in dealing with this model instead with the less restricted one. The perfor-
mance of investment, consumption and tightness improves significantly when allowing for those
constraints while the remaining values are pretty similar to those obtained under the DSGE(1).
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Table 4: Volatilities
Variable US Economy RBC Search DSGE (1) DSGE (2)
Consumption 0.56 0.32 0.27 0.32
Investment 3.14 2.98 2.08 3.12
Total hours 0.93 0.59 0.80 0.75
Employment 0.67 0.51 0.72 0.70
Hours\Worker 0.34 0.22 1.06 1.07
Tightness 9.12 3.30 4.61 6.78
Wage bill 0.97 0.94 1.86 1.89
Productivity 0.64 0.46 0.27 0.32
Real Wage 0.44 0.39 0.26 0.27
One of the major interests of the theoretical model presented in this paper is that if satis-
factory, it can be used to analyze European labor markets. One common characteristic of those
markets is the existence of long-term unemployment or, in other words, high persistence of un-
employment. The standard RBC model with frictional labor markets, although satisfactory in
replicating the persistence of US unemployment, have major problems when replicating the persis-
tence of European labor markets (see Esteban-Pretel, 2004). When we introduce the assumption
of loss of skills in combination with unemployment benefits, the persistence of unemployment
increases substantially. For example, under the Andolfatto model, 86% of the unemployed work-
ers that lose their jobs remain unemployed one quarter apart whereas only 18% of them remain
unemployed within a year. Under our specification almost half of them remain unemployed
within a year, which constitutes almost 70% of the unemployed workers who have suffered from
a depreciation of skills.
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Table 5: Persistence of unemployment
Variable (x) x(t) x(t+ 1) x(t+ 2) x(t+ 3) x(t+ 4)
Search Economy
Total unemployment 1 0.86 0.63 0.39 0.18
Turbulent workers − − − − −
DSGE (1)
Total unemployment 1 0.93 0.80 0.63 0.45
Turbulent workers 1 0.98 0.91 0.80 0.67
DSGE (2)
Total unemployment 1 0.94 0.80 0.63 0.45
Turbulent workers 1 0.98 0.91 0.80 0.67
3.4.2 Implications for the labor market performance
Nowadays we rely on at least three possible potential explanations for the high European
unemployment: the combination of aggregate macro shocks and labor market institutions, the
combination of micro-shocks and labor market institutions and the impact of the evolution of
labor taxation on labor supply. But to disentangle the exact effect of labor market institutions
on unemployment is still an issue we need to resolve5.
The turbulence hypothesis is at the core of the second explanation. In particular, it relies
on the combination of microeconomic shocks to unemployed workers’ human capital and labor
market institutions to explain the steadily increase in European unemployment from the late
1970s onwards while the American unemployment fluctuate around its II World Ward’s value.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) central assumption is that "the last couple of decades saw an
increased probability of human capital loss at the time of an involuntary job displacement" both
in Europe and US.
Given that the values of the estimated parameters are in line with the values proposed by LS,
we can split the initial sample into two sub-samples and analyze whether the data gives support
to the hypothesis of an increase in turbulence or not. Therefore, we split the sample into two
disjoint sub-samples. The first one covers the period 1964Q1-1980Q1, and the second runs the
5See Appendix D for a brief summary of this literature.
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rest of the sample, i.e. 1980Q2-2005Q1. The breakpoint corresponds to the date around which
we consider the European unemployment started rising6.
Then we re-estimate the parameters and check for their stability. Across the board, the test
rejects the null hypothesis of parameter stability. This result is in line with previous findings
of Ireland (2004) and Altug (1989) and Stock and Watson (1996) who also found evidence of
instability in parameters in RBC and VAR models respectively.
But what is more interesting for our analysis, is that the parameter γ that measures the
probability of human capital loss remains constant along the two sub-samples and for both spec-
ifications of the model - with and without constraints on some of the parameters-.
Period Parameter
t1= 1964Q1− 1980Q1 γ1=0.0265
t2= 1980Q2− 2005Q4 γ2=0.0265
Conclusion γ1= γ2
We see this result very interesting as it contributes to the literature on unemployment in the
following way: according to our model and the estimation of its parameters for the US economy,
we do not observe evidence in favor of an increase in the probability of human capital loss. This
does not mean that we find the LS explanation wrong because, in spite of the fact that we do
not observe an increase in the value of this parameter, the turbulence hypothesis is necessary
to improve the performance of the RBC. It is able to increase the persistent unemployment and
consequently generates long-term unemployment. This is a characteristic that previous RBC
models embedding matching models in the labor market were unable to produce.
Stated in other words, we explain the increase in unemployment in the following terms: We
believe that there is a negative aggregate shock that increases the pool of unemployed workers.
This makes the fraction of turbulent workers increase- not because the probability of losing skills
increases but because the initial pool has become bigger due to an aggregate shock-. At this point
we have an increase in the number of turbulent unemployed workers who have loss their initial
skills but receive unemployment benefits that correspond to the high skilled level. The rest of the
story is the LS one. In a way, our results conciliate the macro and micro explanations proposed
in the literature to explain the increase in unemployment and its persistence over time.
6We have tried different breakpoints running from 1975Q4 to 1982Q4, giving all of them similar results.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a DSGE model in which the labor market is explicitly modellized
as a frictional market where firms and workers engage in productive job matches. There are two
types of workers, high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Furthermore, high-skilled workers might
suffer from a depreciation of their human capital while unemployed.
We have estimated the parameters of the model for the US economy via maximum likelihood
and we have seen that the values obtained are in line with those proposed by LS. In particular,
we find very low probability of upgrading skills for the already matched workers and similar value
for the turbulence parameter. We have also analyzed the quantitative properties of our model
and we have studied the stability of the probability of suffering from a depreciation of human
capital.
We find that our model seems to fit the data well, increases the persistence of unemployment
and increases the volatility of tightness. We also find that our model estimated with US data does
not give evidence of an increase in the probability of losing skills around the eighties, contrary
to the central assumption of LS’s explanation. Nevertheless, allowing for this depreciation of
worker’s human capital, generates a very strong persistence of the unemployment for all workers
in the economy and mainly for those who have suffered the loss of skills.
We conclude that according to our model we cannot accept the assumption that a general
increase in turbulence occurred at the end of the 70s both in Europe and US. Instead we find
evidence on the existence of a negative aggregate shock that increased the pool of unemployed
workers. We do not see this as a rejection of subsequent explanation given by LS, i.e. that we
need the combination of the loss of skills assumption and generous unemployment benefits to
produce long-term unemployment and be able to explain the steadily increase in unemployment
over time.
In a way, our conciliate the micro and macro-shock based explanations in the following way:
according to our model, what we find is that is a macro shock that generates the initial in-
crease in the pool of unemployment but that is the micro shock in combination with generous
unemployment benefits what contributes to its persistence.
Nevertheless, further research is needed in this area. It would be desirable to re-estimate it
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for some European countries to have a broader perspective of the problem. Unfortunately, we
will have to wait a few years until this data would be available.
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3.A Appendix: solving for the non-stochastic equilibrium
3.A.1 Households
The household maximizes the following problem
W (ΩHt ) =max
c,k′
{
log (ct) + nh,tφ1,h
(1−hh,t)
(1−ηh)
(1−ηh)
+uh,tφ2,h
(1−e)(1−ηh)
(1−ηh)
+nl,tφ1,l
(1−hl,t)
(1−ηl)
(1−ηl)
+ul,tφ2,l
(1−e)(1−ηl)
(1−ηl)
+βEtW (Ω
H
t+1)
}
subject to the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital
ct+it+Υt= wh,tnh,thh,t+wl,tnl,thl,t+uh,tbh,t+ul,tbl,t+rtkt+Πt
kt+1= (1− δ)kt+it
where ul,t= ut,t+ub,t and bl,t=
ut,tbh,t+ub,tbb,t
ul,t
The first order conditions of the problem and the envelope theorem are presented below:
w.r.t. consumption 1ct= λt
w.r.t. capital t+1 βEt
[
Wk(Ω
H
t+1)
]
= λt
budget constraint ct+kt+1−(1− δ)kt = wh,tnh,thh,t+wl,tnl,thl,t+uh,tbh,t+ul,tbl,t+rtkt+Πt
envelope theorem Wk(Ω
H
t ) = λt [(1− δ) + rt]
and yield the optimal behavior of the household. Therefore, the optimal decisions for the
households are fully summarized by the following equations:
1 = βEt
{
λt+1
λt
((1− δ) + rt+1)
}
ct+it+Υt= wh,tnh,thh,t+wl,tnl,thl,t+uh,tbh,t+ul,tbl,t+rtkt+Πt
kt+1= (1− δ)kt+it
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3.A.2 Firms
The Bellman equation that represents the problem of the firm can be stated as follows:
J(ΩFt ) = max
k,n′
h
,n′
l
,vh,vl
F (ξatk
θ
tL
(1−θ)
t −wh,tnh,thh,t−wl,tnl,thl,t−rtkt−ahvh,t−alvl,t+βE
[
λt+1
λt
J(ΩFt+1)
]
subject to the laws of motion for employment and the AR process defining the technology
nh,t+1= nh,t(1− σh) + qh,tvh,t+ηnl,t
nl,t+1= nl,t(1− σl) + ql,tvl,t−ηnl,t
log at+1= ρ log at+(1− ρ) log a+ε
a
t+1
The first order conditions of the problem are presented below:
w.r.t capital (1− θ)ytkt= rt
w.r.t vacancies for high-skilled workers ah= Θh,t qh,t
w.r.t vacancies for low-skilled workers al= Θl,t ql,t
w.r.t high-skilled employment t+1 Θh,t= βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Jnh(Ω
F
t+1)
]
w.r.t low-skilled employment t+1 Θl,t= βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Jnl(Ω
F
t+1)
]
law of motion for high-skilled employment nh,t+1= nh,t(1− σh) + qh,tvh,t+ηnl,t
law of motion for high-skilled employment nl,t+1= nl,t(1− σl) + ql,tvl,t−ηnl,t
And applying the envelope theorem we have:
for high-skilled employment Jnh(Ω
F
t ) = Fnh,t−wh,thh,t+Θh,t(1− σh)
for low-skilled employment Jnl(Ω
F
t ) = Fnl,t−wl,thl,t+Θl,t(1− σl) + η(Θh,t−Θl,t)
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Thus, optimal decisions for the firms are fully summarized by:
(1− θ) ytkt= rt
ah
qh,t
= βEt
{
λt+1
λt
(
Fnh,t+1 −wh,t+1hh,t+1 +
ah
qh,t+1
(1− σh)
)}
al
ql,t
= βEt
{
λt+1
λt
(
Fnl,t+1 −wl,t+1hl,t+1 +
al
ql,t+1
(1− σl) + η
(
ah
qh,t+1
− alql,t+1
))}
nh,t+1= nh,t(1− σh) + qh,tvh,t+ηnl,t
nl,t+1= nl,t(1− σl) + ql,tvl,t−ηnl,t
3.A.3 Matching
The standard specification of the matching function is the following:
mj,t = χjv
αj
j,tu
1−αj
j,t
and the companion probabilities of matching for workers and vacancies are respectively:
φj,t =
mj,t
uj,t
and qj,t =
mj,t
vj,t
3.A.4 Optimal contract:
To compute the optimal contract we just have to apply the first order condition of the Nash
bargaining problem, which can be stated as follows
(1− p
j
)
1
λt
Wnj= pjJnj
The marginal value of high-skilled and low-skilled employment for the household comes from the
following expressions
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Wnh(Ω
H
t ) =
 φ1,h
(1−hh,t)
(1−ηh)
(1−ηh)
− φ2,h
(1−e)(1−ηh)
(1−ηh)
+ λtwh,tnh,thh,t − λtuh,tbh,t
+βEt
[
Wnh(Ω
H
t+1)
]
(1− φh − σh) + γβ
(
E
[
Wnl(Ω
H
t+1)
]
−Et
[
Wnh(Ω
H
t+1)
])

Wnl(Ω
H
t ) =
 φ1,l
(1−hl,t)
(1−ηl)
(1−ηl)
− φ2,h
(1−e)(1−ηh)
(1−ηh)
+ λtwl,thl,t − λtul,tbl,t
+βEt
[
Wnl(Ω
H
t+1)
]
(1− φl,t − σl)

which together with the income values of employment for the firms, Jnh and Jnl , yield the following
contracts:
wh,thh,t=phFnh,t+phah
vh,t
uh,t
+phγ
(
ah
qh,t
−
al
ql,t
)
+(1−ph)bh,t−(1−ph)ct
(
φ1,h
(1−hh,t)
(1−ηh)
(1−ηh)
−φ2,h
(1−e)(1−ηh)
(1−ηh)
)
wl,thl,t=plFnl,t+plal
vl,t
ul,t
+plη
(
ah
qh,t
−
al
ql,t
)
+(1−pl)bl,t−(1−pl)ct
(
φ1,l
(1−hl,t)
(1−ηl)
(1−ηl)
−φ2,h
(1−e)(1−ηh)
(1−ηh)
)
the optimal values for the hours worked of each type of worker are obtained via the mutual surplus
of the match
Sj,t=
1
λt
Wnj ,t+Jnj ,t
and yield the following results
∂Sh,t
∂hh,t
= −φ1
1
λt
(1− hh,t)
(−ηh)+(1− θ)YtLt
(
1− θ
nh,thh,t
Lt
)
= 0
∂Sl,t
∂hl,t
= −φ1
1
λt
(1− hl,t)
(−ηl)+(1− θ) YtLt τ
(
1− θτ
nl,thl,t
Lt
)
= 0
3.A.5 Government
uh,tbh,t + ul,tbl,t = Υt
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3.A.6 Non-stochastic general equilibrium
The general equilibrium is defined as a set of functions{c, i, vh, vl, uh, ul, nh, nl, t, k,
wh, wl, hh, hl,mh,ml, yt, τ t, bh,t, bl,t}, solution of the following system formed by the optimal
decisions above plus the following equations:
- the resource constraint:
ct+it+ahvh,t+alvl,t= yt
where
yt= ξAk
θ(tt)
(1−θ)
and
tt= nh,thh,t+τnl,thl,t
- the laws of motion for unemployment
uh,t+1= uh,t+σhnh,t−mh,t−γuh,t
ul,t+1= ul,t+σlnl,t−ml,t+γuh,t
- the unemployment benefits
bh,t= rrhwh,t−1
bl,t= rrlwl,t−1
Given that we also impose that 1 = nh,t + nl,t + uh,t + ul,t one of the laws of motion above is a
linear combination of the others plus the condition above and we have to take this into account
3.B Log-linearized equations
3.B.1 Deterministic equations
0 = c∗c(t) + i∗i(t) + ahv
∗
hvh(t) + alv
∗
l vl(t)− y
∗y(t)
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0 = k∗k(t)− (1− δ)k∗k(t− 1)− i∗i(t)
0 = n∗l nl(t)− (1− σl−η)n
∗
l nl(t− 1)−m
∗
lml(t)
0 = n∗hnh(t)− (1− σh)n
∗
hnh(t− 1)−m
∗
hmh(t)− ηn
∗
l nl(t− 1)
0 = n∗hnh(t) + n
∗
l nl(t) + u
∗
huh(t) + u
∗
l ul(t)
0 = u∗huh(t)− (1− γ)u
∗
huh(t− 1)− σhn
∗
hnh(t− 1) +m
∗
hmh(t)
y(t)− a(t)− θk(t− 1)− (1− θ)l(t)) = 0
l∗l(t) = n∗hh
∗
h[nh(t)hh(t)] + τn
∗
l h
∗
l [nl(t)hl(t)]
mh(t)− αhvh(t)− (1− αh)uh(t) = 0
ml(t)− αlvl(t)− (1− αl)ul(t) = 0
0 = ph(1− θ)
y∗
th∗
hh
∗ (y(t)− t(t)− hh(t)) + phah
v∗h
u∗h
(vh(t)− uh(t− 1)) + (1− ph)b
∗
hbh(t)
+phγ
ahv
∗
h
m∗h
(vh(t)−mh(t))− phγ
alv
∗
l
m∗l
(vl(t)−ml(t)) + (1− ph)φ2,hc
∗ (1− e)
(1−ηh)
(1− ηh)
c(t)
−(1− ph)φ1,hc
∗
(f∗h,t)
(1−η)
(1− η)
(c(t) + (1− η)fh(t))−w
∗
hh
∗
h(wh(t) + hh(t))
0 = pl(1− θ)
y∗
ll∗
τh∗l (y(t)− l(t) + hl(t)) + pl
alv
∗
l
u∗l
(vl(t)− ul(t− 1)) + (1− pl)b
∗
l bl(t)
+plη
ahv
∗
h
m∗h
(vh(t)−mh(t))− plη
alv
∗
l
m∗l
(vl(t)−ml(t)) + (1− pl)φ2,lc
∗ (1− e)
(1−ηl)
(1− ηl)
c(t)−
−(1− ph)φ1,lc
∗
(f∗l,t)
(1−ηl)
(1− ηl)
(c(t) + (1− η)fl(t))−w
∗
l h
∗
l (wl(t) + hl(t))
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0 = u∗hb
∗
h(uh(t− 1) + bh(t)) + u
∗
l b
∗
l (ul(t− 1) + bl(t))−ΥtΥ(t)
bh(t)−wh(t− 1) = 0
bl(t)−wl(t− 1) = 0
3.B.2 Expectational equations
0=Et
[
c(t)−c(t+1)+βθ y
∗
k∗
(y(t+1)−k(t+1))
]
0=Et

ahV
∗
h
βM∗
h
(c(t)−c(t+1))+θh
Y ∗
Nh
∗ h
∗
h
(y(t+1)−nh(t)+hh(t+1))
−w∗
h
h∗
h
(wh(t+1)+hh(t+1))+(1−σh)
ahV
∗
h
M∗
h
(vh(t+1)−mh(t+1))
−
ahV
∗
h
βM∗
h
(vh(t)−mh(t))
0=Et

alV
∗
l
βM∗
l
(c(t)−c(t+1))+θl
Y ∗
Nl
∗ τhl(y(t+1)−nl(t)+hl(t+1))+η
ahV
∗
h
M∗
h
(vh(t+1)−mh(t+1))
−w∗
l
h∗
l
(wl(t+1)+hl(t+1))+(1−σh−η)
alV
∗
l
M∗
l
(vl(t+1)−ml(t+1))
−
alV
∗
l
βM∗
l
(vl(t)−ml(t))
3.C Appendix: Macro-data
The macro-data used in this study is real aggregate data of the United States for the period
1964:Q1-2005:Q4. The source is the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.
• vacancies = help wanted advertising in newspapers / (population+16)
• employment = (civilian employment +16) / (population+16)
• unemployment = 1 - employment
• tightness = vacancies/unemployment
• total hours = employment*average weekly hours / (population+16)
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• labor productivity = output / total hours
• consumption: (real consumption of non durables + real consumption of services + govern-
ment expenditures)/(population +16)
• investment = (real consumption of durable goods+ real fixed private investment)/(population
+16)
• output = consumption + investment + vacancies*cost per vacancy
• duration = median duration of unemployment/ (population+16)
• Normalization of output
— output =1
— consumption = Consumption / output
— investment = Investment / output
3.D Appendix: Explanations to the European unemployment
It is well known in the literature of unemployment that until the second half of the seventies,
the European unemployment was significantly lower than the American unemployment, and that
since the late seventies and during the eighties the tendency changed and the European unem-
ployment started to steadily rise while the American unemployment continue to fluctuate around
its post-World War II value.
The increase in European unemployment was largely caused by a lengthening of the average
duration of unemployment spells. So although many Europeans leave unemployment relatively
quickly, a significant fraction of workers become trapped in long-term unemployment and have
little chance of finding the jobs they want.
The first attempts to explain this increase in unemployment relied on the role played by labor
market institutions such as employment protection legislation, both the duration and generosity
of unemployment insurances (see Martin, 1996) and the role of firing costs (see Bentolila and
Bertola, 1990). The problem with this explanation is that also during the sixties and seventies,
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when the unemployment in Europe was lower than in the US those labor market institutions
existed already (see Krugman, 1987).
Another early attempt to explain this rise in unemployment focused on the negative effect
that some macro-shocks could have had on unemployment. Among this macro shocks we find the
oil-price shock of 1973 and 1979, the TFP growth slowdown since the early 1970s and other shifts
in labor demand experienced since the 1980s. This interpretation was also challenged by Phelphs
(1994) who saw improbable that these initial shocks, which indeed have been largely reversed
lately, could still be responsible for high unemployment more than fifteen years later. Phelps, for
example, emphasized factors that increased the real interest rate and consequently the rate of
unemployment.
The stability of European labor market institutions before and after the late seventies and
the difficulty of aggregate shocks to explain the persistence of unemployment, lead to another
stream of explanations that consider the possibility that changes in the economic environment, in
particular aggregate macroeconomic shocks, interacted with labor market institutions to unleash
persistently high unemployment. This hypothesis blamed adverse shocks for the initial increase
in the rate of unemployment, and labor market institutions for the persistence of this rate.
The explanation based on the interaction of adverse shocks with adverse labor market in-
stitutions has been studied in detail by Blanchard and Wolfers (1999). They call the attention
about the potential to explain not only the increase in unemployment over time through adverse
shocks and the fact that some institutions may affect its persistence but they can also explain
cross country differences7. In a companion paper Blanchard and Wolfers, (2000) look, through
panel data specifications, at the empirical evidence about the role of macro shocks, the role of
institutions and the role of the interaction between shocks and institutions in accounting for the
European unemployment. Their results suggest that specifications that allow for shocks, institu-
tions and interactions can account both for much of the rise and much of the heterogeneity in the
7Recently, Nickell et. al. (2005) consider a plausible story the fact that in response to the initial increase in
unemployment, governments reacted by taking the wrong measures. They explain how governments in order to
alleviate the pain of unemployment increased the generosity and duration of unemployment or in order to limit
the increase in unemployment, they tried to prevent firms from laying off workers through tougher employment
protection or even . To better share the burden of low employment, they used early retirements and work sharing
to better share the burden of low employment. All these measures then in turn increased unemployment even as
the initial shocks disappeared.
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evolution of unemployment in Europe.
The second big stream of explanations given to the high European unemployment focus on the
interaction of micro-shocks and labor market institutions rather than focussing on the interactions
of those institutions and aggregate shocks. The two main interpretations of these findings come
from Bertola and Ichino(1995) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). Bertola and Ichino show that
given the rigid wages and the high firing costs that prevail in Europe during the 80s, a higher
likelihood of negative shocks in the near future decreases labor demand by hiring firms. And
as long as the wage rate does not fall, the equilibrium unemployment rate would rise. This
explanation remind us, the "thin market externality" reasoning proposed by Pissarides (1992).
Ljungqvist and Sargent’s series of papers, LS from now onwards, advocate for the interaction
of shocks to individual worker’s human capital, turbulence in their words, and generous unem-
ployment benefits to produce long-term unemployment in Europe. In particular, they assume
that in the late 70s and during the 80s, the probability of suffering from a depreciation of human
capital increased and unleash the following mechanism: Imagine a worker who suddenly loss his
job. Once unemployed he receives an unemployment benefit proportional to his former wage
and become a low-skilled worker. If any, he is going to receive job offers corresponding to this
low-skilled level and accordingly, he is going to be offered low wages. It easily could be that
those low-wages do not cover the reservation wage of the worker which we can identify with the
high-skilled unemployment insurance. If this is the case, he is going to reject the offer and will
become trapped in unemployment.
More recently, a new hypothesis come up to the fore. Prescott (2004), advocates for the
role of tax rates, in particular the effective marginal tax rate on labor income, in accounting for
the changes in the relative labor supply across time and across countries. Interesting findings of
this study are that when European and US tax rates were comparable, European and US labor
supplies were comparable and that the low labor supplies of Germany, France and Italy during
the nineties are largely due to high tax rates.
Therefore, nowadays we rely on at least three possible potential explanations for the high Eu-
ropean unemployment: the combination of aggregate macro shocks and labor market institutions,
the combination of micro-shocks and labor market institutions and the impact of the evolution
of labor taxation on labor supply. But to disentangle the exact effect of labor market institutions
on unemployment is still an issue we need to resolve.
